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1. Introduction 
 
Big Pharma is perhaps one of the most maligned industries in the modern world. The 
thought of executives in crisp suits profiting from the illnesses of others is sufficient to 
upset the moral sense of the average person. However, in spite of such scorn being 
heaped upon the industry from all and sundry, it remains one of the most profitable 
commercial sectors in the global economy. The health of the public (or lack thereof) is 
big business and pharmaceutical companies make a killing developing, producing and 
providing the medicines to treat the vast array of ailments that affect the human 
species. They are major contributors to the national exchequer wherever they operate 
and provide employment to countless people at all levels within their organizations. 
They are at the forefront of science and many of the greatest discoveries in medicine 
can attributed to their efforts. 
 
Contributions notwithstanding, the fact that the business directly affects the health and 
wellbeing of billions of people, places the industry in a category separate from the 
consumer goods we enjoy in our daily lives. We believe that development, production 
and provision of medicine to those who need it, inherently contains a moral and ethical 
dimension that places the health needs of the public above the bottom-line of the 
industry. The question is whether it is the former or latter that takes precedence or if a 
balance is struck between the two. 
 
In this project we ask this very question in the context of the United Kingdom. We 
analyse the relationship between government and the pharmaceutical industry to 
identify the power dynamics that characterise it. In doing so we identify the various 
forms of power exercised and how these affect each other. This gives us an idea of 
which party hold the greater power and why. We then do a cursory test of our findings 
by reviewing the UK government’s response to the House of Commons Health 
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Committee’s report on the influence of the pharmaceutical industry. Finally, we 
discuss the implications of the analysis and suggest alternatives to put the needs of 
public health firmly in the driver’s seat again. 
 
The theoretical foundation for our analysis is Lukes’ 3 dimensions of power. The 
analysis shows that power in the 1st and 2nd dimension tilts in favour of the 
government, thereby securing the interests of public health. However the domination 
by the pharmaceutical industry in the 3rd dimension nullifies the power of government 
in the 1st and 2nd dimension and indicates that the interests of the pharmaceutical 
industry take precedence over public health where the interests conflict. Our review of 
the government’s response to the Health Committee Report shows that though the 
Health Committee report was critical of the level of influence exerted by the 
pharmaceutical industry, the government’s response was remarkably laissez faire. 
This indicates that the government is either unaware or wilfully ignoring the power 
asymmetry implied by our analysis. We then conclude with suggestions as to how the 
power asymmetry may be resolved and public health given priority over 
pharmaceutical industry profit. 
 
1.1 Problem Area 
 
Public health-care makes up a significant part of the welfare state, with its aim to 
maintain a healthy society and promote equality. The National Health Service (NHS) in 
the UK was formed in 1948 under the principles of universality, high standard of care 
and free provision for all, funded through central taxation (Talbot-Smith & Pollock, 
2006:2). These principles still remain intact, however privatisation has been a 
dominant reform of the public healthcare sector in the UK, with many services being 
outsourced, creating a culture of profit and marketisation within public health (Talbot-
Smith & Pollock, 2006:2). This level of privatisation has been rapidly increasing since 
the Conservative agenda during the 1980's and has led to major structural changes in 
the NHS (Talbot-Smith & Pollock, 2006:5). Despite this evolution in public health, one 
area of provision that has been consistently performed by private enterprise is drug 
development (Abraham, 2009:936). 
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The Pharmaceutical industry, also referred to as "Big Pharma" involves high risk 
investment due to high R&D costs but also large profit margins. Currently, only 1 
chemical substance out of 10,000 is marketed by pharmaceutical companies which 
exemplifies the lengthy and costly process of drug development (Tigssen, 2009:859). 
However, despite the high costs of medical R&D that Big Pharma has to absorb, 
marketing costs are double that of R&D (Spitz & Wickham, 2012:10), implying the 
incentive for profit dominates the agenda. It is the neo-classical economic assumption 
that the profit incentive and competition drives innovation which will lead to the best 
outcomes in public health provision (Spitz & Wickham, 2012:10).  Big Pharma has the 
ability to prioritise which drugs are developed and which are not;  fuelled by their drive 
to increase shareholder value (Rodwin, 2012:512). Instead of developing drugs that 
would produce significant therapeutic advances, drugs are analysed by their potential 
profitability (Rodwin, 2012:513). Through patents, companies create monopolies over 
particular drugs, increasing their bargaining power and control over how prices are 
set. These patents also prevent the sharing of knowledge between companies, 
resulting in conflicting efforts and an increased timeframe to produce the drugs that 
will be to the greatest benefit to society (Osuji & Umahi, 2012:145). 
  
As the global population increases so does the demand for public health services; and 
with budgets being overstretched, the public health sector has to prioritise which drugs 
are worth the steeping prices, creating an ethical dilemma in public policy. Due to the 
increasing privatisation of public health, there is arguably an absence of sufficient 
cost-benefit analysis of whether these private contracts produce the better outcome 
for patients (Dunleavy, 1986:15).  With drug purchasing the largest area of 
expenditure for public health, the pharmaceutical industry is growing at a faster rate 
than GDP worldwide with their profit margins increasing steadily (WHO, 2010:5). 
These contradictory incentives raise questions about the ethics of private R&D and the 
power that pharmaceutical companies have in adjusting supply and demand for drugs. 
  
We identify that these conflicts of interest between public health and pharmaceutical 
companies undermine the NHS's core principles of universal, quality care (Talbot-
Smith & Pollock, 2006:5). However, in spite of this inconsistency of objectives, public 
health care still relies on private enterprise for development and provision of new 
medicines and treatments, despite the fact that the number of innovative new 
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medicines being produced has consistently decreased since the early 1990’s 
(Abraham, 2008:945). This reliance is based on the assumption that private enterprise 
is more effective at R&D and that the profit motive generates the optimal outcome, 
echoed by the Secretary of State declaring in 1977 “that a profitable manufacturing 
industry provides the basis for all the social improvements we want to see” (Abraham, 
2008:948). We believe however, that the reliance of public health care on private 
enterprise delimits the potential to develop drugs with the highest therapeutic value. 
This is an important dilemma to explore as the topic of public sector funding, 
particularly in health care, dominates political agendas but the discussion often 
neglects how pharmaceutical companies dominate due to their profit incentive. 
  
In 2005, the House of Commons Health committee released a report title ‘The 
Influence of the Pharmaceutical Industry in the UK’. This review of the industry was 
the first to be conducted in nearly a century and portrayed the relationship between 
Big Pharma and the public healthcare sector with a critical tone. It laid down a series 
of recommendations for the government to undertake in order to regulate the industry 
and thus minimize its negative impact on the population. However, contrary to 
expectations, the report did not elicit much action from the Health department and the 
relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and the NHS has continued 
essentially unaltered since (Kerwin, 2007:132). 
  
Despite the clear evidence justifying why these recommendations should be actions, 
the lack of implementation implies the complex nature of the relationship between Big 
Pharma and Public Health. It points to an undue preference for profit for the industry. 
Indeed the report itself admits that this is the case, noting that: 
  
"The interests of pharmaceutical companies and those of the public, patients and the 
NHS often overlap but they are not identical. For the industry, medical need must be 
combined with the likelihood of a reasonable return on investment. An effective 
regulatory regime to ensure that the industry works in the public interest is essential" 
(House of Commons Health Committee Report, 2005) 
  
Despite the report calling for increased and more effective regulation of the industry, 
little action has been taken, with the Government’s response implying that its 
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regulation is already sufficient (Kerwin, 2007:132). A part of the answer lies in the fact 
that the UK Health Department is tasked with balancing the needs of both public 
health and pharmaceutical company, being responsible for the former and sponsoring 
the latter. The report mentions an ingrained assumption in the Health department of 
the alignment of interests between Public Health and Big Pharma which will be 
discussed in more detail in later chapters.  
  
The pharmaceutical industry is seen as indispensable to the provision of healthcare to 
those who require it. It is to the for-profit private enterprises that health providers look 
for the development and provision of new medicines. Quoting Brody’s book critiquing 
the pharmaceutical industry’s practices and ethics Badcott (2013) states 
 
"Remove the industry and its products, and a considerable 
portion of scientific medicine’s power to help the patient 
vanishes" 
 
Even the academics and clinicians with the most critical perception of Big Pharma 
view the industry as a necessary evil, that must be continuously monitored and 
regulated in order to keep the development of medicines uninterrupted while ensuring 
the greatest benefit of patients.  
 
There is sufficient research indicating that a significant conflict of interest exists. Most 
experts and clinical staff will echo the sentiments expressed in the House of 
Commons Health Committee (HC) report that the Pharmaceutical industry's activities 
are harmful to public health (Kerwin, 2007:132). However, in spite of the efforts of 
regulators, the trend for the pharmaceutical industry to prevail in its intentions 
continues, regardless of the needs and requests of public healthcare and the patients 
it serves, evident in the Government’s response to the report. 
  
In this project, we seek to illuminate why this often antagonistic relationship continues. 
The issue at hand is the power dynamics that exist between public health on one hand 
as represented by the government, and the pharmaceutical industry on the other. As 
the HC report admits, the interests of both parties are not always aligned (House of 
Commons Report, 2005). Consequently, the government must exercise its power and 
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establish a strong regulatory framework to prevent the pharmaceutical industry from 
realising its interests where these may infringe upon the interests of public health. 
However, if the power relationship is unbalanced and in favour of the pharmaceutical 
industry, we posit that regulation as seen today cannot achieve the goal of reining in 
the industry and prevent its interests from dominating those of public health. 
  
Abundant research has been conducted by official instances, academics and clinical 
staff alike that outline the various manners in which the pharmaceutical industry 
exercises its power. Almost always the research suggests some manner of action to 
ameliorate the effects of pharmaceutical power to reduce its dominance. The 
partnership between private enterprise and the government in public healthcare is not 
questioned. However, a broad view of the various facets of power relationship is 
required to precisely answer the question of why not.  
 
Asymmetric power relations favoring the pharmaceutical industry are naturally 
problematic. However more problematic than that would be a denial or blindness to 
this problem by the weaker party in the equation, namely the UK government. Tasked 
with ensuring the best possible outcome for its citizens, the government must be 
cognizant of it strengths as well as its weaknesses if it is to make effective policy 
decisions. If there is evidence of asymmetric power relations characterising the 
relationship, and the government continues to make policy decisions ignoring such an 
important fact, it will be unable to effectively counter the challenges posed by Big 
Pharma. 
1.2 Project Outline 
  
Big Pharma has an obligation to its shareholders and must therefore maximise profits 
using all available means whereas public healthcare sectors are obliged to provide the 
best possible care to the population at large, outlined by their core principles (Talbot-
Smith & Pollock, 2006:1). While some argue that this does not necessarily represent a 
conflict of interests, history shows that the different priorities of the two parties 
inevitably clash. 
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In the first section we will document the behaviour of a for-profit pharmaceutical 
corporation and the government’s regulatory efforts by describing and analysing the 
history of the pharmaceutical industry in the UK. We will then do a review of the nature 
and primary motivations of the government in light of their drug policies and regulation 
of the pharmaceutical companies. We will describe the structure of both the 
pharmaceutical industry and public health care in the UK so the adversarial 
relationship between the two may be sufficiently exposed. In this section we will also 
establish that the primary governmental antidote to the power of Big Pharma is more 
extensive and more strictly enforced regulation which provides us with the basis of our 
further analysis. 
 
In the second section of our project we look at the interactions between these two 
parties. Given that the relationship between Big Pharma and public health necessarily 
contains an adversarial element, an analysis of the power relations between the two is 
important. Ostensibly, the state and its healthcare sector is the more powerful party, 
having the ability to regulate and legislate as needed. Its status as the single largest 
customer also seemingly gives it control over the actions of Pharmaceutical  
companies operating within its boundaries. This however does not mean that Big 
Pharma is powerless. Here we are informed by Lukes’ 'Three Dimensions of Power', 
which provides the multiple levels of analysis required to illuminate the power 
relationships. While the state and its healthcare sector wields overt power, Big 
Pharma have more subtle, and arguably more effective ways of achieving their goals. 
The objective of this analysis is to determine whose interests dominate and question 
the course of public health care policy. 
  
We consider that the dynamics of the power relationship between the Government 
and Big Pharma are such that the question is not how the Government can restrain 
Big Pharma’s corporate influence, but in fact question whether government should be 
relying on private enterprise for the majority of development and provision of 
medicines. We present our argument by looking at the relationship between the 
pharmaceutical industry and public health policy implemented by the Government in 
the United Kingdom. We essentially aim to provide an alternative perspective on the 
relationship between private pharmaceutical enterprise and the UK government’s 
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public health priorities to question whether such a relationship has the capacity to 
achieve the optimal benefits for the general public. 
  
To establish the validity of our power analysis we turn to the UK Government’s 
response to the Health Committee Report presented by then Secretary of State for 
Health Patricia Hewitt. We conduct a review of the specific responses to the 
recommendations of the HOC report to find evidence of the impact of the power 
relations implied by the power analysis.  
 
Finally we devote a section to drawing a set of conclusions from our research and 
engage in a discussion. 
 
  
1.3 Research Question: 
  
What does a power analysis of the relationship between the pharmaceutical industry 
and the UK government reveal about the government’s capacity to control Big 
Pharma? 
  
Working Questions: 
  
● What is the historical relationship between the UK government and Big 
Pharma? 
 
● What characterises the power relations between Big Pharma and the UK 
government? 
  
● What impact do the power relations outlined by Luke’s theory of Power have in 
terms of the government’s response to the challenges posed by Big Pharma? 
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2. Methodology 
  
Our methodology is informed by a critical theory perspective and aims to question the 
basic assumption regarding the partnership of public health care with the 
pharmaceutical industry, in the provision of healthcare to the population. In order to 
answer this question we look at the case of the UK Government and its relationship 
with the pharmaceutical industry. 
  
We wish to build a framework of analysis which will allow us to gain a broad view of 
the overall relationship. We take into account the various expressions of power that 
characterise the relationship to see not only how they affect the behaviour of either 
party individually, but also how they affect each other. While it is a relatively easy task 
to find academic literature analysing one or more expressions of power, we have as 
yet not come across any that take an overall view to analyse how each of these 
expressions of power affect the others. We intend to do this by placing the various 
academically established expressions of power in a framework and analyze how they 
relate to each other. We then look for evidence of the power relations implied by this 
framework of analysis through a review of the UK Government’s response to the 
recommendations of the 2005 HOC Health Committee report.  
  
We have chosen to focus on the public healthcare sector in the UK as our object of 
analysis. This choice is based on the fact that the National Healthcare Service (NHS) 
is one of the oldest public healthcare services in the world and one that has been 
emulated by national health care providers the world over (The Economist, 2014). 
The UK is also home to several of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies, 
including major firms GSK and AstraZeneca (ABPI, 2015), which provides us with 
ample opportunity to research the dynamics between nationalised public healthcare 
and the private pharmaceutical industry. We aim to investigate the issue from an 
interdisciplinary perspective, drawn from two subject areas, Sociology and Political 
science that are included in the basic courses of social science. 
  
The analysis therefore can be divided into two distinct steps. The first step is an 
analysis of the pharmaceutical industry as well as the UK governmental health policy 
with regards to pharmaceuticals. The objective is to identify the basic patterns of 
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behaviour that characterize the two parties and consequently identify the various 
expressions of power implied. We then do a power analysis of the relationship 
between the UK government and the pharmaceutical industry. Our starting point in this 
project has been patient welfare i.e the end consumers of NHS services. In itself a 
conflict of interest does not necessarily represent a danger to patients as long as their 
interests are ensured by the party with the most power. If however their interest are 
subdued by opposing or incompatible interests of a more powerful party, then it is 
reasonable to assume that patients suffer. This may not be the case in all 
circumstances, however it makes the benefit of the patients subservient to other 
interests and thus decreases the quality of care that they receive. 
  
In order to conduct the analysis with an overall, “birds eye view”, we will be identifying 
the various expressions of power by both the Government and the pharmaceutical 
industry and determining how they can be classified according to Luke’s dimensions of 
power. This will involve placing the various expressions of power into a table, giving us 
an overview of the academically established expressions of power. In turn this will 
allow us to build a qualified opinion on the cumulative effect of all the expressions of 
power and determine whether there is a power equilibrium or if one or the other 
dominates. 
 
The second step of our analysis seeks to view the government’s response to the 2005 
Health Committee Report in light of the power relationship implied by our analysis. 
The objective of this step is to find evidence of the actual impact of the power 
relationship on the government’s capacity to perceive and act upon the challenges to 
the public healthcare sector. If the government fails to acknowledge the existence of a 
fundamental problem such as a power asymmetry favouring the pharmaceutical 
industry, it will be unable to address the issue at all. This includes going as far as 
questioning the wisdom of depending on private enterprise for the development and 
provision of medicines in the first place. 
 
 
 
2.1 Critical approach 
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The perspective we have adopted is critical theory, categorised by how it does not 
view nature independent from society. It is assumed that the object or phenomenon is 
dynamic, thus it cannot lose its prior identity by evolving. Just as an adult is the same 
person as when they were a child, they have merely evolved, the same can be applied 
to society. Drawing on this assumption, we can conclude that it is inherently wrong to 
eliminate the fact that the pharmaceutical industry is a profit- maximizing enterprise by 
stating that its ground incentive is to serve society as it is creating new medicines by 
conducting R&D (Horkheimer, 2003:221). Social reality is expected to be analysed by 
focusing on specific issue or area individually by using specialised theories and 
assumptions based on the historical background of these particular individual objects. 
Nevertheless it should still be regarded as a whole because processes are dependent 
on each other. Therefore, we argue that the lack of government's response, or its 
inability to sufficiently address the conflict of interest, is part of the power struggle 
itself. Thus, this cannot be separated even though the pharmaceutical industry is 
inherently focused on its economic gain. 
Key assumptions of critical theory perspective are: 
○ it is critical about other theories and existing social, cultural and 
economic conditions, assuming that they should be challenged to 
evolve. 
○ It draws from  modernity and a belief that criticism can affect change. 
○ It is committed to theory and believes that quantitative data is not 
sufficient enough without qualitative.  
○ Theory is situated, not disconnected, from what is happening in the 
world - enabled by specific social conditions. 
○ Challenges the nature of things and interested in the social and historical 
processes that shape the object at a specific moment. 
○ Analyses social constructions, power struggles, inequality and 
oppression, and is committed to emancipation. 
○ Relates theory with practice. 
 
Ontologically, we follow a critical theory perspective and social constructivist point of 
view by doing power analysis and reviewing the Government’s response to the 2005 
Health Committee's Report on the influence of the pharmaceutical industry in order to 
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examine whether the power struggle is a phenomenon that both parties are engaged 
in. Capitalist society is constructed in a way that it believes that pharmaceutical 
companies can be constrained to some extent by regulation. Hereby, according to the 
assumption of critical theorist Horkheimer, a change in societal construction is not 
detached from social reality but argues that criticism allows evolution and progressive 
change (Horkheimer 2003).  
 
‘The objective occurrence is independent of the theory, and this independence 
is a part of its necessity: the observer as such can effect no change in the 
object. A consciously critical attitude, however, is a part of the development of 
the society: the construing of the course of history as the necessary product of 
an economic mechanism simultaneously contains both a protest against this 
order of things, a protest generated by the order itself, and the idea of self-
determination for the human race, that is the idea of a state of affairs in which 
man's actions no longer flow from a mechanism but from his own decision.’ 
(Horkheimer 2003;223) 
 
It is justifiable to assume that by criticizing the socially constructed idea of Big 
Pharma, positive change should be achieved. Epistemologically, in order to 
understand the power struggle we take into account and critically observe the 
historical background and the given abilities of both parties regarding the economy, 
politics and legislation. The dependent variable in this project is the government’s 
response to the pharmaceutical industry's actions, and the independent variable is the 
power relations.  
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3. Theory 
  
The relationship between the UK government health department and the 
pharmaceutical industry is long-standing and not without its tensions. Taking it as a 
given that the primary objective of the Health Department is the provision of optimal 
healthcare for patients, we consider it to be the main proponent of the patients’ 
interests. The primary objective of the pharmaceutical industry lies elsewhere, and 
while these interests may coincide, the industry may well sacrifice the benefit of the 
healthcare system (and by extension, the patients) in favour of profit. Thus, in order to 
see whether the current relationship works to the benefit of patients, we must 
determine who possesses the greater power. We use Steven Lukes’ three dimensions 
of power as the framework for the analysis. 
  
While used with ease in everyday language, the concept of power has generated 
much debate among academics in a variety of social science fields ranging from 
political science to sociology (Hay 1997). Yet in spite of such a wide variety of 
scholarly work on the subject a full and final definition of the concept remains elusive. 
  
The most common view of power is what Dahl describes as his “intuitive idea of 
power” (Dahl in Lukes 1974) namely when A possesses the ability to get B to do 
something that B would otherwise not do. This is perhaps the description that 
resonates most easily with laymen, and reflects the experience of people faced with a 
conflict of interest where one party must bow to the other. This is what Luke’s defines 
as the first dimension of power. It is the most visible expression of power as it is 
exposed in conflict and can be measured in terms of whose preferences are realised. 
  
“...this first, one-dimensional, view of power involves  a focus on behaviour in the 
making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of 
(subjective) interests, seen as express policy preference …” (Lukes S. 1974:15) 
  
Hay (1997) states that this particular view was immensely popular precisely because it 
provided an uncomplicated object of analysis and thus also simplified the methodology 
required to study power. Indeed one can see the attraction of such a view for these 
very reasons. 
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In the context of our analysis, we will be looking for examples of overt expressions of 
power where one or the other party is able to secure its preferences. Practically this 
will mean looking at examples of overt conflicts of preferences and how one or the 
other manages to impose its will on the other. This can range from examples of 
regulations and standards being imposed on the pharmaceutical industry or the 
pharmaceutical industry succeeding against the government by using its considerable 
economic dominance due to the revenue and investment it provides to  the UK. 
  
Lukes proceeds to the second dimension of power relating the work of Bachrach and 
Baratz who criticised the pluralist one dimensional view as being far too simplistic 
(ibid). The one dimensional view stresses action and sees power only in the specific 
decisions arising from a situation with a conflict of interest. They argue that power has 
two faces, stressing that preventing a decision from being made or “non-
decisionmaking” is an equally effective form of power. As they say: 
  
“...power is exercised when A participates in making decisions that affect B. Power is 
also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and 
political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to 
public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A.” 
(Bachrach and Baratz in Lukes 1974:16) 
  
This view of power then allows for the possibility that the debate is manipulated in 
such a manner that the conflict simply does not arise. Not because the conflict of 
interest does not exist in terms of the preference of A and B, but rather because A 
prevents B from expressing their overt interests, thus precluding the possibility of A’s 
preferences being threatened. 
  
This dimension of power is more difficult to measure, as there is no overt conflict that 
may be analyzed. The inaction implied by this view of power can only be measured by 
postulating that certain actions ought to have taken place, and drawing a  
comparison between what ought to have happened and what did take place. This will 
require that certain conclusions be drawn from our analysis regarding those 
preferences suggested by the analysis but which have not been placed on the 
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agenda. We will also be looking for instances in which one party may prevent the 
other from addressing an issue by controlling information. 
In both the above views the question of preferences is taken for granted with the 
assumption that both A and B are aware of their preferences and that the preferences 
reflect their best interests. 
  
Lukes proceeds with the “radical” aspect of his view of power by adding a third 
dimension. He argues that A may exercise his power over B  not only by getting him to 
do what he does not want to do, but also by shaping B’s preferences so that they align 
with A’s preferences more closely than with B’s own interests. 
  
“Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to to have 
desires you want them to have - that is, to secure compliance by controlling their 
thoughts and desires?” (Lukes 1974:23) 
  
The distinction here between preferences and interests implies that the exercise of 
power is not restricted to the arena where combatants already know what they are 
fighting for. Rather it allows for the possibility that A can assure his preferences before 
even an inkling of conflict arises by simply convincing B to choose preferences aligned 
with the interests of A rather than his own. 
  
This third dimension creates an analytical problem that makes the analyst the sole 
arbiter of what B interests are (Hay 1997). While B may express his preferences, in 
the event that A exerts power in the 3rd dimension, B will be unable to express his 
interests. This leaves it up to the analyst to decide unilaterally what B’s actual interests 
are and thereby determine the extent to which A has influenced B in a manner to 
move his preferences away from those preferences. 
  
We are aware of the problem of the analyst being inherently condescending when he 
assumes that B is incapable of knowing what is the best option for him. Lukes insists 
that an empirical base for the identification of interests must be established, however, 
given the normative nature of determining what is good for B whether he wants it or 
not, Lukes does not succeed in identifying how such an empirical base may be laid out 
(Hay 1997). 
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3.1 Theoretical Limitations 
 
Lukes 1974 edition was written in the context of American society and politics in the 
70s and designed to address the ongoing debate on power at the time. It became one 
of the most influential texts on the subject and formed the basis for the work of many 
academics. The 2005 edition contains two additional chapters and bears the marks of 
the 3 decades of intervening work by Lukes himself and other scholars such as 
Foucault and Bordieu (Schwartz, 2007). His perspective undergoes a conceptual shift 
in certain areas. Firstly, a definition of power should be focused on the capacity or 
ability for its exercise rather than the exercise itself. Secondly, Lukes becomes 
cognizant of the fact that his work deals with the demeaning form of power i.e 
domination, while accepting that not all power is negative or zero-sum. Some forms of 
“power over” may in fact be positive and transformative, for instance that of a teacher 
and student. Lastly, Lukes conceptualization in 1974 focuses on power in a binary 
relationship and in terms of unitary and opposing interests. In 2005 however he admits 
that power relationships may exist with multiple parties and a broader spectrum of 
interests. 
 
“Dimensions” for the purposes of what Lukes describes is in fact a misnomer. What 
Lukes describes in his book is more accurately forms of power than dimensions. The 
“radical” aspect of his theory is in identifying the gaps that the first and second 
dimension (with their behavioural focus) fail to do, and adding instead a form of power 
which methodologically is extremely difficult to measure and quantify. In fact, his entire 
book remains in the theoretical realm without discussing any empirical method of 
positively identifying the nature and quality of power in the third dimension. In this 
regard the identification and empirical measurement of power in the second dimension 
suffers the same fate.  
 
In terms of our project we have made some choices to account for the weaknesses in 
Lukes perspectives. We accept the conceptual shifts in his 2005 text, looking at the 
potentiality rather than the actuality of the power that plays a part in the relationship 
between the UK government and Big Pharma. Also , just as Lukes we accept that 
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power is not always a negative and zero-sum game. However in the context of the 
relationship between Big Pharma and the UK government we focus on dominant form 
of power which by its nature is zero sum. Lastly, we are aware that the power relations 
that characterize the relationship between the UK government and Big Pharma are far 
more complex than the simple binary relationship we describe in our project. Within 
the UK government there are multiple diverging interests as well as within Big 
Pharma. Likewise, the interests of both parties are neither unitary nor always opposed 
to each other. However we are simplifying the relationship and boiling it down to the 
primary interests of either party and analyzing those through Lukes’ lens. 
 
Without a proper empirical methodology to apply, for the purpose of this project we 
must outline our methodology for identifying the various power capacities. We must 
simultaneously accept that any such methodology will necessarily not be as 
exhaustive as could be desired.  
 
3.2 Delimitation of Aspects 
 
As this is a third semester project we have obviously been limited in regards to both 
time and resources. As a result all of our empirical data is second hand and certain 
aspects of the relationship between Big Pharma and The UK Government have not 
been taken into account. 
 
The first aspect that we have excluded from the project consists of illegal actions. 
Several cases of bribery and the likes thereof came to our attention during our 
research, but we have intentionally decided not to include such activities in our scope. 
Though illegal activities might empower Big Pharma in form of, for example, influence 
in decision-making we do not consider this to be an expression of power. Additionally 
we do not seek to insinuate or accuse Big Pharma of committing punishable offenses. 
Doing so would come across as highly biased and would damage the credibility of the 
project, as we cannot possibly prove if criminal actions are taking place. 
 
Secondly we have decided not to include the concept of regulatory capture. 
Regulatory capture appears when a regulatory organisation created to act on behalf of 
19 
the public is influenced by the industry or sector, which it is concerned with regulating. 
Consequently, commercial or political interests of the industry or sector might be 
prioritised ahead of public benefits. As regulatory capture is seen as a form of political 
corruption we have also decided to leave it out of consideration. Although it might be 
easier for us to establish cases of regulatory capture than criminal offenses, the 
influence thereof would be highly speculative, as we have no insights in the actual 
decision-making process or the rationale behind decisions made by regulatory entities. 
 
Lastly we recognise that there might be aspects outside our scope that are not 
incorporated, which could have had an effect on the final outcome and discussion. 
 
3.3 Key Assumptions 
 
Here we list a number of key assumptions upon which our project is predicated. 
Listing these assumptions serve two purposes; to inform the reader firstly of the main 
starting points of our argument and secondly of the biases that impact our analyses 
and conclusions. 
3.4 Multiple Actors and Multiple Interests 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, we are well aware that the UK government 
cannot be considered a unitary actor with a single interest. The various departments 
within the governmental apparatus, the succession of political and bureaucratic 
individuals at the helm and shifting societal and political circumstances inevitably 
mean that not only does it comprise of multiple actors internally, but also that its 
interests are dynamic and in a constant state of flux. There is little doubt that the 
interest of healthcare provision of the government can clash with the interests of other 
departments, however defining the internal power balance of the various interests 
goes beyond the purview of this project. 
 
Thus, in order to apply Lukes’ theoretical approach, it is necessary to simplify. We do 
this by making a normative assumption that in the context of public health the 
government’s primary interest lies in the benefit of its citizens. This means the 
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provision of the highest quality of healthcare, the most effective medicines and the 
best medical research possible. A secondary interest is that these services be 
delivered in the most cost efficient manner, as this directly affects the scale and scope 
of delivery. 
 
3.5 Pharma for Profit 
 
The pharmaceutical industry consists of for-profit corporations. The primary objective 
of these corporations is the maximization of profit. While these companies tend to 
present themselves as benefactors whose primary concern is the health and wellbeing 
of its consumers, altruism is not the driving force behind the industry’s actions. The 
direct link to the health and quality of life that this industry has to countless millions 
nevertheless does not prevent it from acting as any for-profit organization 
3.6 Sources 
 
Using Lukes theory on power presents a number of methodological challenges which 
we seek to address in this section. Already mentioned is the problem of correctly 
identifying and empirically justifying expressions of power in the second and third 
dimension. As the objective of our project is to look at the various expressions of 
power in the relationship between the UK government and the pharmaceutical industry 
from a broad perspective, we are forced to use a broad variety of sources for our data. 
The first part of our methodology depends on filling out the table below. 
  
We intend to review expressions of power in each dimension using appropriate 
sources both government and Big Pharma. In doing so it will give us a visual 
impression of the various forms of power in play in the relationship and allow an 
analysis of how they relate to each other.  
The First Dimension 
The First dimension is perhaps the easiest to identify, given its focus on observable 
conflict. We will be employing sources the indicate expressions of power in the first 
dimension such as official reports, legislation, regulation and news reports.  
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The Second Dimension 
The second dimension of non-action and agenda setting is as mentioned, more 
difficult to identify. Here we must use similar sources as above and extrapolate 
possible points of conflict that remain unaddressed. 
The Third Dimension 
In the third dimension we will be relying on established academic research to identify 
examples of this form of expression of power.   
 
The second part of our analysis requires a review of the government’s response to the 
Health Committee’s report. This response was presented to the UK parliament by then 
Secretary of State for Health Patricia Hewitt in September 2005, 6 months after the 
Health Committee Report. The Health Committee Report was initially released during 
the tenure of the previous Health Secretary John Reid.  
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3.7 Introduction to the NHS and Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
The following chapter will outline the history of the NHS and the pharmaceutical 
industry in the UK. The focus will be on significant changes to safety regulation, 
financing, pricing and provision policies that the UK Government have implemented 
since the formation of the NHS, and an account of what public health and 
pharmaceutical provisions existed previously. This brief historical and contextual 
description will highlight some examples of the antagonism between the UK 
Government's public health policies and the pharmaceutical industry that has existed 
throughout the NHS's lifespan. This will provide us with a starting point for our 
theoretical analysis of the different dimensions of power that each agent expresses. 
Through tracking this historical tension between the two agents, we can identify the 
changes and limits of governmental regulation in restricting the Pharmaceutical 
industry’s corporate power. By highlighting this, we can then see that the 
Government’s only response to limit pharma’s influence is in Luke’s first dimension of 
power through regulatory policy,  which will allow us to analyse whether regulation is 
an effective restraint.  
 
4.1.1. Incentives to Form the NHS 
The NHS in the UK was formed in 1948 and providing free healthcare for all and 
founded under three guiding principles; Firstly, it would be universal, and thus 
everyone would have access to the same standard of care. Secondly, it would be 
comprehensive and thus encompass all health needs in its delivery, and thirdly it 
would not be means-tested but be free for all (Talbot-Smith & Pollock, 2006:2). All of 
these incentives aimed to increase the level of equality as the UK was financially 
crippled after World War II (Abraham, 2009:932). The NHS is funded through central 
taxation, whereas previously the 1911 National Health Insurance Act outlined a policy 
that only those on the lowest incomes could receive "medical benefit", and therefore 
healthcare contained many inequalities in its provision (Abraham, 2009:936). Central 
taxation ensures that financial and clinical decision making are somewhat separate so 
doctors do not have to consciously think about revenue when treating patients. Most 
importantly however is that it provides a sense of unity in society as all UK citizens 
23 
have the right to access free healthcare without discrimination (Talbot-Smith & 
Pollock, 2006:2). 
 
4.1.2. Privatisation of the NHS 
The NHS has changed dramatically since 1948, with the most prominent reform being 
privatisation of many services and a new culture of marketisation within public 
healthcare (Talbot-Smith & Pollock, 2006:1). Previously, pharmaceutical provision was 
the only area of the NHS's health care that was consistently privatised since 1948 
(Abraham, 2009:936). However now it is reported that between April 2013 and April 
2014, 68% of new health contracts were awarded to non-NHS bodies (NHS Support 
Federation, 2015).  The implications for these changes outline how the NHS has 
created an internal market which encourages a level of competition and the 
development of new devolved bodies that have weakened the state's political 
accountability (Talbot-Smith & Pollock, 2006:1). The current structure of the NHS  
remains governed by The Secretary of State for Health, functioning as the overall site 
of responsibility of the NHS, then the Department of Health (DoH) which acts as the 
ministerial body for strategic leadership.  However, this privatisation has also fuelled 
further devolution of NHS bodies, such as NHS England which remains further away 
from Government control and overlooks the quality of care and allocates funding to 
CCG's (NHS Choices 2015). 
 
These changes can be traced back to the privatisation boom of the 1980's under 
Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government. This began with the introduction of 
private contracts regarding cleaning and catering services in hospitals and has since 
expanded into clinical services (Talbot-Smith & Pollock 2006:5). This introduction of 
contracting out areas of public health can be explained by increasing corporate 
pressure which has been sustained through government policy (Dunleavy 1986:14). 
The Conservative agenda since 1979 has put pressure on local NHS bodies to seek 
out outsourced contracts, pressuring these authorities to accept private contract bids 
even when they undermined the bids of internal NHS services (Dunleavy 1986:14). In 
the 1990's, privatisation continued and led to further development of the "internal 
market" (Talbot-Smith & Pollock 2006:6). In 1990, the NHS and Community Care Act 
outline that hospitals and community health bodies would combine to become NHS 
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Trusts that would compete against one another in the health market (Talbot-Smith & 
Pollock, 2006:6). The health authorities emulated the 'buyers' of the system and the 
NHS Trusts became the 'sellers', causing these different NHS bodies to interact like 
businesses (Talbot-Smith & Pollock 2006:6). The motivations of these changes were 
to improve efficiency and patient choice and open up the NHS to the much needed 
increase in capacity as demand for public health increased (Talbot-Smith & Pollock, 
2006:7). In 2000, the current framework of the NHS was further outlined by the 
publication of The NHS Plan which reversed the Governments promises that the 
clinical services of the NHS would not be privatised. The justification derives from the 
need for greater capacity, which has converted the government from a direct provider 
of healthcare via the NHS, to now its main role as the direct payer (Talbot-Smith & 
Pollock, 2006:7). 
 
4.1.3 History of the Pharmaceutical industry and the UK Government, pre-1948 
By the time the UK government had implemented its plans for the NHS in 1948, the 
pharmaceutical business was a well-established industry. Since the industrial 
revolution, it had moved from small-scale apothecaries to large scientific laboratories 
in a range of established firms (Abraham, 2009:936). Its relationship with the state 
was initially segregated, with little or no regulation, specifically in its marketing 
freedom and safety measures. In particular, before the late 19th century, there was a 
culture of self-medication in regards to pharmaceuticals which led to a lack of 
knowledge of relevant safety precautions (Penn, 1979:301). In the 1875 Sale of Food 
and Drugs Act, the quality of drugs was  analysed by ensuring the chemicals 
contained in the drug were written on the packaging, however this again neglected 
any direct call for safety regulations (Abraham, 2009:936). It was not until The Select 
Committee on Patent Medicines published a report in 1914 that called for stricter 
regulation on the pharmaceutical industry. In its recommendations, it requested that 
there be legal restrictions on the advertising of drugs by non-established practitioners 
,which would be enacted by the Department of Health. This triggered a greater state 
involvement in its regulation of the pharmaceutical industry (Penn, 1979:302) . 
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In 1925, The Therapeutic substance Act was implemented in order to regulate both 
the manufacture and sale of biological substances through its labelling procedures 
and new licensing system for the Minister of Health (Penn 1979:302). This new role of 
the Licensing Agency also involved inspections within the industry itself, specifically 
focusing on its employee competencies. The Act outlined the framework for modern 
safety regulation but failed to properly address issues with efficacy. It was not until 
years later, that this was sufficiently delivered through the 1968 Medicines Act which 
addressed the severe lack of safety regulation after numerous of pharmaceutical-
based tragedies (Abraham, 2009:938). 
 
3.8. Relationship of Government and Big Pharma Since 1948 
i) Financing Medicine in the NHS 
Since the formation of the NHS in 1948, the cost of medicines became a significant 
issue very quickly. Because access to free healthcare was universal, the number of 
prescriptions rose exponentially; for example in 1951 the number of prescriptions 
trebled to 200 million (Abraham, 2009:936). However, this cannot be purely explained 
by the implementation of free healthcare;  During this period, marketing of prescription 
drugs to doctors increased, and so did the intensive use of patents that the 
pharmaceutical industry used to monopolise and charge high prices. The medicines 
bill for the newly formed NHS thus became a severe problem and indicated early on 
the problems associated with privatised pharmaceuticals (Abraham, 2009:937). 
 
In 1949, the UK government attempted to address these issues of high numbers of 
prescriptions by creating a Joint Committee on Prescribing (JCP) to evaluate the 
therapeutic value of drugs, and encourage doctors to prescribe generic drugs as 
opposed to branded (Abraham, 2009:937). The JCP found that doctors were 
consistently either duplicating prescriptions or prescribing expensive branded 
medicines and to curb this, they devised a list of appropriate medicines that the JCB 
felt were safe and effective for use. They also granted doctors less clinical freedom by 
requesting that they only prescribe branded medicines when they were confident that 
it provided greater benefit than its generic counterpart. This is the first example of 
economic rationalization on the pharmaceutical industry through the government's 
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regulatory policies. However, looking contextually, it is important to highlight that the 
post-war economy in the UK was extremely fragile; and the threat to the industries 
exports was a serious consideration for government policy that relied on this boost to 
the economy (Abraham, 2009:937). The Association of British Pharmaceutical 
Industry (ABPI) were deeply concerned about the effect of this rationalization and 
engaged in secret talks with the Ministry of Health to warn them of the effects to the 
UK economy. Although these list of approved drugs for prescription were published, 
the next decade was categorised by lobbying the Government in the name of free 
trade (Abraham, 2009:938). 
 
Another major change in the provision of drugs existed in 1989, when the 
Conservative government released a controversial white paper, Working for Patients. 
The Government was worried  by their ever-increasing drugs expenditure, which had 
risen by 4% every year during the past five years. In this paper, the Government 
called for GP surgeries to be allocated an individual budget for prescriptions by their 
regional health authority (Baines, 2014:20). This would be implemented by the 
creation of new management structures who would have greater local autonomy in 
deciding on pharmaceutical budgeting. This was met with hostility from patients, the 
pharmaceutical industry and political opposition. The ABPI called for an independent 
analysis on how this new policy would affect the pharmaceutical industry, questioning 
whether this supply-side reform is appropriate for health-care which is largely about 
demand. The report claimed that these changes would have a great effect on the 
choice, provision and quality of pharmaceuticals as well as affecting the UK economy 
(Baines, 2014:21). Despite much opposition, these policies introduced in 1991 still 
exist today with little reform (Baines, 2014:22) 
 
ii) Pricing systems of drugs in the UK 
The pricing of pharmaceuticals has been a consistently important topic of debate due 
the rising drugs bill and because historically, the UK has had the highest drug 
expenditure in the whole of Europe. This is not merely due to higher levels of 
prescriptions but also due to the increasing cost of drugs (Abraham, 2009:946). Up 
until 2014, the pricing of drugs has been through a voluntary agreement between the 
Department of Health and the industry, using a system of Pharmaceutical Price 
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Regulation Scheme (PPRS). The scheme was implemented in 1957 and was 
renegotiated by both agents every 5 years (Abraham, 2009:947). The scheme worked 
by setting a limit on the capital that the pharmaceutical companies could accumulate 
from the drugs they sold to the NHS, which meant that pricing did not revolve around 
individual drugs and their benefit (Bradley & Vanderos, 2012:31).  For example, in 
2009, the limit on capital accumulation was between 8.4% and 29.4%, meaning that 
those companies whose profits were under the 8.4% margin were allowed to increase 
their drug prices to meet the threshold (Bradley & Vanderos, 2012:33). 
 
The PPRS scheme has been under constant review since its implementation due to 
many varying opinions on its effectiveness. Much of its criticism derives from an 
economic standpoint as limiting profits thus limits tax gain and may also deter 
companies to reside in the UK (Bradley & Vanderos, 2012:33). In 2007, the Office for 
Fair Trading released a report calling for a re-negotiation over how drugs were priced, 
so that the prices reflect the therapeutic value of that particular drug. In 2014, Value-
based pricing (VBP) was employed. This almost utilitarian approach, aims to link 
pricing with the social benefit of a drug, as well as provide better control in curbing 
drug expenditure. The new system has divided opinion due to the complexity of the 
arrangement. Firstly, there is a philosophical question of how "value" is measured in 
regards to "cost-effectiveness" as there needs to be a well-calculated balance 
between those drugs forgone by the continued use of other drugs that may have 
greater "benefit" for the patient (Carroll, Claxton & Sculpher, 2011:1). One of the main 
incentives however is that VBP rewards innovation as its price is determined by its 
increase in therapeutic value, which means that it may address some of the reasons 
why the pharmaceutical industry rapidly reduced its number of breakthrough drugs in 
the last few decades (Bradley & Vanderos, 2012:33). However, as this system is 
newly implemented, there is limited literature on its effects and therefore a detailed 
analysis of VBP would be limited. 
 
iii) The Changes in Safety Regulation Policies 
As previously discussed, the pharmaceutical industry has an history of limited 
regulation imposed by the UK government regarding the safety of its products. During 
the first two decades of the NHS, there was little reform of these limited regulations 
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that were outlined by the 1925 Therapeutic substance Act, but it in 1971 the new 
Medicines Act was implemented (Abraham, 2009:938). The reason for this new call for 
increased safety measures is arguably in relation to the thalidomide disaster in 1961, 
in which thousands of pregnant women had birth deformities whilst they took the 
tranquilizer to help them sleep. During this period, the UK Government did not require 
any safety tests before a drug went to market, giving potential for unsafe drugs to be 
prescribed by clinicians (Penn, 1979:303). During the 1960's, the debate surrounding 
efficacy and the safety of drugs increased , epitomised with Kenneth Robinson's 
statement, in 1965 calling for reform : 
 
"The House and the public suddenly woke up to the fact that any drug manufacturer 
could market any product, however inadequately tested, however dangerous, -without 
having to satisfy any independent body as to its efficacy and safety and the public was 
almost uniquely unprotected in this respect." (Penn, 1979:303) 
 
To begin the process of reform, the Government established the Committee on the 
Safety of Drugs (CSD) to evaluate the toxicology of drugs before they were released 
on the market, advising both the industry and Government (Abraham, 2009:940). The 
CSD's functions were to monitor the adverse reactions of a drug before and after 
marketing and created subcommittees of experts to implement this (Penn, 1979:303). 
The committee however was not legally entrenched and therefore the industries 
cooperation was not compulsory. The members of the CSD were employed by the UK 
Government but required financial backing from the industry to orchestrate trials, and 
completed their reviews in a very short-time frame to ensure drugs were quickly 
placed onto the market. This indicates a key influence of industry interests due to the 
CSD's economic dependence on the industries financing (Abraham, 2009:940). 
 
Advised by the newly formed Department of Health, the CSD would be replaced by 
The Medicines Act, based on the White Paper published in 1967 titled 'Forthcoming 
Legislation on the Safety, Quality and Description of Drugs and Medicines' (Penn, 
1979:304). The Act itself is centred around a licensing system of the marketing, 
exportation and testing of drugs, in which the licensing authority  gives licences based 
on clinical trials performed by experts. Like the CSD, The Medicines Act put 
procedures in place to ensure that it had a quick process of testing and also employed 
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members of the industry as part of their negotiation process (Abraham , 2009:941). 
However, those drugs that were on the market before the Act were not subjected to 
this review and therefore there were many drugs that still remained unregulated. This 
was only reformed when in 1975, the European Economic Community called for all 
drugs to be regulated by their standards but was not completed until 1990 (Abraham, 
2009:39). The Act also encouraged more involvement of GP's and devolved some of 
their responsibility  through the "Yellow Card scheme". This asked doctors to report all 
adverse reactions to the drugs they prescribed with the aim to highlight any drugs that 
may have been wrongly tested, and provide an early warning of the potential threats. 
However, the system proved to be a difficult task to perform, and in reality, doctors 
only reported between 1 and 10% of adverse reactions during its initial stages, yet it is 
still a major policy in drug safety regulation (Abraham, 2009:942). 
  
The industry's response to The Medicines Act through the ABPI was negative, 
outlining the economic threats to limiting doctors prescriptions of new drugs. The 
National Economic Development Council also echoed this when they advised that for 
the industry to make its biggest social contribution, then the Government should limit 
its controls on the industry to avoid harm to its economic benefits (Abraham, 
2009:943). During the 1980's, the industry continued to lobby government for 
weakened regulation, using the threat that the development of new drugs would be 
moved abroad if the UK government continued to sabotage their profitability. The 
government responded by adopting a new form of regulation where the industry 
funded the trials completely. They set up the Medicines Control Agency (MCA) which 
had an business-orientated structure and sold its services to the industry with its 
premise that it was the fastest approval agency for new drugs in the world and would 
save taxpayers money (Abraham, 2009:944). The MCA emphasised that new drugs 
would reach the market faster, which would improve patient access to innovative 
drugs. However, the number of drug innovations over the past few decades has 
decreased whilst regulation has continued to be diluted, implying the link between 
regulation and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry (Abraham, 2009:944). 
 
In 2003, the Government merged the Medical Controls Agency (MCA) and Medical 
Devices Agency (MDA), creating the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory 
Agency (MHRA), and in 2013, the National Institute for Biological Standards and 
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Control (NIBSC) was also incorporated into the remit of the MHRA. With clinical 
evidence, the MHRA regulates medicines safety and assesses claims of unsafe 
prescriptions. The MHRA is aware that drugs are never completely safe due to 
inevitability of side effects, but will analyse whether the advantages that they produce 
outweigh the negatives (MHRA, 2015:2). Once a drug has been through a clinical trial 
and confirmed to be safe for use, the MHRA grants the pharmaceutical company the 
license to market and sell their product in the UK (MHRA, 2015:5). The MHRA is 
funded mostly by UK Government, however there are also fees that are charged to the 
pharmaceutical companies for the licensing and trial costs. Both global and national 
institutions such as NICE in UK as well as the FDA in America collaborate with MHRA 
to ensure international standardisation in medical regulation (MHRA, 2015:4). The 
MHRA also extends its influence to post-marketing surveillance of drugs, monitoring 
the use of drugs within the NHS and also reacting to any reports of adverse drug 
reactions from the yellow card scheme (House of Commons Report, 2005:23).   
 
The MHRA addresses the potential for a conflict of interest to occur between them and 
Big Pharma, by governing their committee members by the 2006 Code of Practice. 
This regulation calls for each member to make an annual declaration of their interests 
they that have in the pharmaceutical industry (Lexchin & O’donovan, 2009:643). 
Before they enter the committee, they are required to “dispose” of their links and 
vested interests with the Pharmaceutical industry which is arguably difficult to prove 
(Lexchin & O’donovan, 2009:644). During the first few years of the MHRA’s formation, 
28% of its head committee were found to have direct links with the pharmaceutical 
industry and out of the 7 members that were not meant to have any links, 2 had non-
personal interests with the pharmaceutical industry (Lexchin & O’donovan, 2009:645). 
From this micro-level analysis, we see that even the regulation of committee members 
was abused, highlighting the somewhat unavoidable conflict of interest that exists 
between the UK Government and Big Pharma.  
 
iv) Formation of NICE 
To curb the problems associated with the cost-effectiveness of drugs and how to 
determine their therapeutic value, in 1999 the Department of Health formed a new 
health authority, The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) which is 
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still an important entity for UK drugs regulation today. One of the mandates of NICE is 
to "speed up the pace at which good value treatments were used across the NHS, in 
turn promoting and encouraging successful innovation on the part of clinicians, 
pharmaceutical companies and the medical devices industry." (NICE, 2015). NICE's 
range of analysis also looks at technology and surgical methods, but its main focus is 
on pharmaceuticals (Abraham, 2009:955). NICE exists also to address the "postcode 
lottery" of  NHS, as its devolved structure may cause a geographical inconsistency in 
pharmaceutical provision (Abraham, 2009:958). The process of review that NICE will 
analyse new drugs and then inform the NHS whether they believe the drug should be 
purchased, based on their evidence-based, cost-benefit analysis (Abraham, 
2009:957).   
 
There has however been instances where NICE's recommendation to not employ a 
drug has been met with opposition from the industry and the public. For example, in 
1999, NICE recommended that the flu-drug Relenza should not be prescribed. After 
the industry's condemnation of the decision, NICE retracted their decision, 
encouraging the NHS to use the drug at risk due to new evidence. There was much 
speculation from clinical professionals that there was no new scientific evidence, but it 
is often argued that the industry's pressure had influenced NICE's decisions 
(Abraham, 2009:955). This re-structuring of NICE's role due to corporate pressure is 
also evident in the increased use of risk-sharing incentives that involve a collaboration 
between the NHS and industry e.g. the NHS may buy the drug at full price but then be 
reimbursed by the industry its effects are not satisfactory (Abraham, 2009:957). 
Another issue with NICE is that it does not review all marketable drugs due to lacking 
resources, with an average of around 20 appraisals a year (Raftery, 2006). One way 
that it has been suggested to deal with this is to increase the speed of the review 
process by using less thorough methods of analysis. This suggestion was initially 
rejected by NICE but in 2008, the Department of Health echoed this and requested 
that these reviews be completed in a few months of the drugs launch onto the market 
(Abraham, 2009:959). NICE therefore sits awkwardly between the Government’s need 
to ensure value-for-money with innovative drugs and the constraint of Pharma’s 
corporate incentive to market drugs as quickly as possible.  
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v) 2005 House of Commons Health Committee Report 
As previously discussed in chapter 1, in 2005, the House of Commons Health 
Committee released a report outlining the influence of the pharmaceutical industry on 
the UK’s public health system. Looking at this report is important for our analysis as it 
is a critical reflection on how Pharma has shaped the UK Government’s  regulatory 
policies, and also highlights how governmental organisations have viewed this as a 
significant problem in public health provision. The report itself contains a detailed 
analysis of the different regulatory bodies that exist, describing how they are 
“insufficiently effective” (House of Commons, 2005:3). The report’s particular concerns 
surround the unsafe use of drugs, ill-designed clinical trials that may contain corporate 
biases, and over-medicalisation of our society, which are effects of both big Pharma’s 
influence and failing government policy (Ibid:4). 
 
After the report's analysis of the current failures in regulation, it lists its 
recommendations for how policies and procedures can be improved. Most of these 
recommendations were then responded to by the UK government, who disregarded 
many of these suggestions as unnecessary or already part of their plans for reform 
(Kerwin, 2007:131).  We will be looking at the response to the Report in light of our 
power analysis to see how the power relationship between the government and the 
pharmaceutical industry affects the response.  
 
3. 9. Summary: Is increased regulation the answer? 
 
In order to identify the extent of which regulation is the most suggested area of reform, 
we have conducted a data search to highlight how many articles contain the 
recommendation that regulation of the pharmaceutical industry in the UK should be 
reformed. To conduct this we have searched the following in SUMMON: 
 
"The conflict of interest between the UK Government and the Pharmaceutical industry" 
 
From this search, we took the top 15 articles that were published after the year 2000 
and specifically looked at whether they discuss current regulation in place, and also 
whether they recommended regulatory reform to weaken the influence of Big Pharma. 
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Out of the 15 articles, 12 of them mentioned regulation as part of their argumentation 
on the conflict of interest between the industry and the UK Government. Of these 12, 5 
of these articles specifically mentioned that more stringent regulation would improve 
the antagonistic relationship between Pharma and the UK Government, specifically 
stressing the need for greater transparency in 3 of the articles. This emphasis on 
regulation focused on different aspects of drug development; from improving 
physicians training on this conflict of interest to increasing drug approval agencies 
level of clinical autonomy. It is thus clear from our research that regulation, 
implemented by the UK government, is perceived as the most effective restraint on the 
influence of Big Pharma by both clinicians and academics. 
  
The historical review in this chapter has described how regulation has changed since 
the formation of the NHS, and highlighted how the UK government have restrained 
some of their regulation due to the influence of the pharmaceutical industry. What both 
of these analyses highlight is that there has consistently been a need for tighter 
regulation, but also a reluctance for the UK government to implement this greater 
control on the actions of Pharma, often due to economic restraints. It is from this 
analysis that we see that Pharma's corporate interest influences the regulatory 
framework in the UK, and also highlights that increased regulation is the most 
frequently suggested reform. However, what is not often questioned is whether 
regulation is the most effective restraint due to the corporate bias that exists in the UK 
Government’s health care policies.  Here is where Lukes’ power analysis in the 
following chapters can illuminate the complexity of Pharma's influence, by analysing 
how Big Pharma prevents radical regulatory reform. This is necessary for us to 
understand how Big Pharma can manipulate government regulation in subtle and 
unobservable ways, allowing us to conclude whether regulation is the most 
appropriate method of constraint. 
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4. Power Analysis 
 
In the following we will attempt to illuminate the power relationship between the British 
Government and Big Pharma in accordance with Lukes three dimensional perspective 
on power. We conduct the analysis on one dimension at a time, first with government 
and then the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
4.1 First Dimension of Power 
 
The one-dimensional view of power is often referred to as the pluralist view of power. 
Lukes’ first dimension of power is build on the work of the likes of Dahl, Polsby and 
Wolfinger, who all adopts the pluralistic approach to power, however Lukes three 
dimensions disputes pluralism as he believes that the pluralist methodology implies a 
pluralists’ conclusion being inherent in its concepts, approach and method, and in his 
contrary view these are capable of producing non-pluralist conclusions in certain areas 
(Lukes, S. 2005). In summary, the distinctive features of the one-dimensional view of 
power has a focus on behaviour and decision-making as well as observable conflict 
and subjective interests. As Lukes himself concludes: “one-dimensional, view of power 
involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there  
is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests” (Lukes, 2005 : 19).  Therefore, at the 
one-dimensional level, a conflict of interest or preference must be present in order for 
one to stipulate an experimental test of power. Without a conflict, the exercise of 
power will be absent. This is consistent with Dahl’s intuitive idea of power, which is 
defined as “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B 
would not otherwise do.” (Dahl, 1957 : p. 202-203). 
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4.1.1. Government 
Regulatory Power 
The government must exercise control over medical devices and medicines provision 
in many aspect of health care system and structure as many gates as possible 
because there is not one, but many ways that Big Pharma is considered to be using to 
go around the legislations, market, sell their product and get profit. While all the 
medicine and medical devices are regulated, there’s a different system for regulating 
the products that have the most significant effect in comparison with the ones that are 
considered safer and the access to them is not that strictly regulated. First of all, direct 
advertising to patient of these products, is usually prohibited (except US and New 
Zealand) (Edgar, 2013). Additionally there are other gatekeepers that exist for 
monitoring the fright of the product between the developer and the consumer, patient 
in this case (Ibid).  
 
William Asscher, the former chairman of the UK’s expert advisory Committee on 
Safety of Medicines, expressed that in order to be able to control the government 
needs to work on provision after the drug has been released to the market, because, 
as Asscher declares, there is not a way for the regulatory organs to be completely 
convinced if the medical product is sufficiently effective, his reasoning is that the trials 
are tested on animals in which you can never be 100% sure that the human body will 
react the same way as the animal’s does. Furthermore, he expresses that for these 
reason above, in UK the process of the approval is relatively short, regarding the 
policies of the regulatory bodies (Abraham, 2002).  
 
Pharmacovigilance is a branch of pharmacological science that refers to the control of 
adverse effects of pharmaceutical products. It is one of the tools that government has 
in place in order to include society in the process of detecting faulty medical devices 
and medicines.  Health care professionals are introduced to the science and 
operational processes of pharmacovigilance, meaning they are taught to know how it 
is important and how to report adverse drug reactions (ADRs). On the other hand, a 
recent study argue that even though pharmacists in UK are able to effectively report 
ADRs, the rate of such apprise is low. The reason, as the study shows, is the fact that 
there is a very small amount of hours dedicated in their 4 years study to educate 
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pharmacists on the importance of pharmacovigilance and how to actually enact such a 
science (Smith & Webley, 2012). To gather the data needed for to estimate and 
evaluate on pharmaceutical products benefit versus the disadvantages, crucial for the 
control of Big Pharma, the Yellow Card Scheme was implemented in 1964 (McLernon, 
2012). Previously mentioned in our historical analysis, the Yellow Card Scheme is a 
policy that the UK’s government has established to enhance the ADRs reporting and 
hereby ‘employ’ the patients themselves. This system allows citizens and healthcare 
professionals to report about any ADR’s, medical devices adverse reactions, faulty 
medicines or counterfeit medical products (yellowcard.mhra.gov.uk, 2015; McLernon 
et al., 2012). 
 
MHRA, the main body created for the surveillance of Big Pharma, is funded by the 
NHS to review medical devices and funded partly by the pharmaceutical industry. 
There has been a lot of discussion about it being too reliant on Big Pharma’s 
commissions and therefore failing to comply it’s main and fundamental objective 
(Naish, 2012).  MHRA’s work on pharmacovigilance has been exposed, mostly as 
there has been reported cases where the same product in US has been removed from 
the market by Food and Drug Administration due to a negative impact on patients, 
while MHRA has not taken action (parliament.uk). For example, in the US there was a 
case which recorded 60,000 deaths related to the use of the drug for arthritis called 
Vioxx, which surprisingly caused no alert in UK. Similarly,this also happened with 
breast implants in 2010, when plastic surgeon Azhar Aslam had repeatedly attempted 
to report faulty breast implant as he was getting unusual number of cases where the 
product erupted, one that has in fact been approved by MHRA(Naish, 2012). The 
response was rather inadequate; first it was said that the possibility of failure was only 
1%, but later it was admitted that the MHRA could not possibly assess the product due 
to missing data from plastic surgeons, and hereby shifted the blame on them. Also 
when it comes to legal responsibility, the MHRA has failed several times, there has 
been a case when diabetes drug Avandia, produced by GlaxoSmithKline in 2010 has 
been repeatedly sued in US and in UK the drug was only banned after European 
Medicines Agency decision even though  MHRA was advised by NICE (ibid). Another 
product of GlaxoSmithKline, the antidepressant Seroxat, has been banned only after 
the BBC exposed the story, even though the concerns were displayed both by the 
media and the GP’s. The MHRA came to a conclusion that the drug was safe 
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according to the data provided by the manufacturer, which later showed that GLK had 
concealed the data about increased rates of suicides, associated with Seroxat. Now at 
this stage, according to the initial purpose of the Agency, GlaxoSmithKline was 
supposed to be sued as it not only did not provide safe enough product for the public, 
but also consciously has hidden data from the government in order to sell the product 
at any price. Despite the fact MHRA reported that they were powerless because there 
were no authoritative ground for them to prosecute GSK upon (Naish, 2012).  
Consumer Power: 
There are two main regulatory organs within UK’s healthcare system which are NICE 
and MHRA, yet it is important to clarify the difference between them. One of NICE’s 
(National Institute for Health and Clinical excellence) main responsibilities relevant for 
this project, is technology appraisals - which involves the evaluation of a 
pharmaceutical product before it reaches the market. It is assessed whether it is i) 
recommended, ii) restricted or iii) not recommended. The NHS is obligated by law to 
provide patients with a medicine that has been recommended, and to ban or restrict 
the products that have not been recommended adjudged by data provided by NICE. 
Important to highlight is that the decision is not final and the products that are not 
recommended by NICE are allowed to apply for reassessment after alteration (Cerri et 
al. 2013). 
 
The MHRA  has the power to eliminate a product from the market, to restrict or 
completely ban production and prosecute the manufacturer in case if it fails to comply 
with the law (mhra.gov.uk). The employees are prohibited to have any affiliation with 
pharmaceutical companies or manufacturers in order to restrict biases as much as 
possible, at least according to the earlier mentioned Code of Practice and the official 
flyer of MHRA (mhra.gov.uk). Although interestingly, the apical decision making body 
of the agency, the Corporate Executive Team (CET) is crowned by Ian Hudson, who 
for almost a period of 12 years time, has worked with R&D in GlaxoSmithKline 
aforetime when in 2001 he has shifted to the side of the government (mhra.gov.uk, 
2015; Naish, 2012). Please see chapter 3 for further examples of how bias exists 
within the committee.  
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In terms of Lukes’s one dimensional view the regulatory power, that NHS holds and 
deals with the first and most obvious conflict of interest. NHS’s and hereby state’s, 
incentives are, as we have mentioned before, the maximum benefit for the patient with 
the minimum cost, unlike the main incentive of the Big Pharma which is the maximum 
profit just as any other enterprise has. In 1957, voluntary agreement was established - 
The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) is renewed every five years but 
was reviewed in 2014 and has recently been replaced by Value-based pricing (Please 
see chapter 3). Its main purpose was to create a healthy relationship between 
pharmaceutical companies and UK government and also sustain a good environment 
for medical R&D (abpi.org.uk). Although the UK has increased its drug spending 
exponentially in recent years, for example in 2000 the public and private healthcare 
sector expenditures where 6% of country's GDP and in 2013 it was 9.1% (Propper, 
2001; data.worldbank.org, 2015). This has caused the relationship between pharma 
and Government to become even more antagonistic as the NHS bill is rapidly 
increasing.  
Conclusion 
The UK government exercises two main forms of power in the first dimension. Firstly, 
the regulatory authority vested in the government in essence, possesses the ultimate 
power. Regulatory power means that the government in principle can place any 
restriction or demand on the pharmaceutical industry and compel it to adhere to it. 
Secondly the government, as the single biggest buyer of pharmaceutical products 
possesses a certain level of consumer power. Both of these powers, if taken at face 
value, would indicate that the government has the dominant position in the power 
relationship. But as our further analysis shows, the pharmaceutical industry can make 
use of powers in other dimensions to render the government’s powers all but impotent. 
 
 
4.1.2 Pharmaceutical industry 
Economic Coercion: 
It seems rather obvious that large industries with economic power at a scale similar to 
that of the pharmaceutical industry, will always attempt to influence the regulatory 
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framework to their advantage by exercising economic power. Marx foresaw a capitalist 
state with capitalistic interests as the only concern, but in a modern welfare state 
interest of capitalistic nature needs to be balanced with the interests of the citizens if 
the two are not equivalent. As a result of the challenge of balancing these often 
conflicting interests, large multinational industries such as the pharmaceutical industry 
are empowered with the ability to impose both positive and negative sanctions on the 
government (Edgar, 2012). If a conflict of interest or preference transpires, and Big 
Pharma is unsuccessful in persuading the government to changing its behaviour 
through rational arguments, Big Pharma might coerce the government by threatening 
to reallocate its investments, thus influencing employment, personal income, tax 
revenue and ultimately the economy of the entire country. In 2010 two of the major 
pharmaceutical firms, namely Novartis and Roche, according to The Guardian, 
threatened to pull out of Britain. The threats were made as the companies believed 
safety trial rules were disproportionately rigorous compared to other markets and 
because the NHS was forcing prices down. In response to the threats health minister 
Mike O’Brien flew to Switzerland to discuss the situation with the firms. If the firms had 
turned their threats into reality and left the UK, up to 5.000 jobs would be at stake. 
This most likely concerned the government who then, according to Mike O’Brien, 
sought to “make the UK a more favourable environment for pharmaceutical 
companies” and emphasised its aspiration to “do what it takes to make the UK the 
location of choice in Europe for biopharmaceutical industry activity” (Evans and 
Bosely, 2010). The above-mentioned example is a case of Big Pharma exercising 
power in the first dimension over the government by threatening to impose direct 
sanctions by relocating its investments, and thus coercing the government to change 
behaviour and re-evaluate regulation. In this particular case Big Pharma were unable 
to persuade the government through rational argumentation and therefore had to take 
other capacities into account, but as the mere capacity of threat is considered a tool of 
power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962), similar conflicts in the past might have been 
settled before a threat was utilized by Big Pharma. 
Conclusion: 
As private enterprises, pharmaceutical companies are subject to the regulatory 
frameworks established by government. However the combined economic force of the 
pharmaceutical industry ensures that the wishes of the industry are not easily ignored. 
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The financial impact of any or all of the major pharmaceutical companies quitting the 
UK would have severe economic repercussions for the government and thus gives a 
significant amount of power to the industry. 
 
4.2 Second Dimension of Power 
 
Lukes definition of the second dimension of power relies heavily on the work of 
Bachrach and Baratz, who in Two Faces of Power, 1964, challenged Dahl’s and 
others pluralist characterization of the concept of power. According to their work, 
power does not only exist where there is observable conflict as expressed in the first 
dimension. An essential argument in their work is that power can be exercised even 
when conflict is not observable. They agree, of course, that power exists when the 
decision-making of A influences B, but adds: “power is also exercised when A devotes 
his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional 
practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only 
those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A” (Bachrach and Baratz, 
1962:948), meaning that A, being a group or individual, possesses power if they can 
prevent conflict from arising (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962) (Lukes, 2005). If A is 
successful, “B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any 
issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences” 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1962:948). This form of behaviour/non-behaviour, where B 
refrains from acting because of the anticipated response from A, is defined as non-
decision- making. Conclusively the most essential difference between the first and the 
second dimension of power, is the consideration of non-decision making. The second 
dimension takes into account, that power may be exercised by limiting the capacity of 
decision-making and therefore, decisions that are being prevented from taken on 
potential issues where a conflict of interests exists, are assessed. However, as 
previously mentioned, the assessing of non-decision-making is decidedly 
philosophical and as Bachrach and Baratz themselves states, it is impossible to 
determine empirically whether acceptance of the status quo is due to sincere 
unanimity or due to enforcement through non-decision-making (Lukes, 2005). 
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4.2.1 Government 
 
The Government’s non-decision power is essentially an extension of the power it 
wields in the 1st dimension. The threat of the government imposing new and stricter 
regulations, or exercising its consumer power can be sufficient to alter the behaviour 
of the pharmaceutical industry in line with the government’s wishes.  
 
4.2.2. Pharmaceutical Industry 
Tacit Coercion: 
As we mentioned at the end of our first dimension analysis, having the ability to utilize 
the threat of sanctioning is considered as possessing power. Edgar, 2013 came to the 
same conclusion as he interpreted Bachrach and Baratz. He stated: “the mere threat 
of economic sanctions may inhibit the possibility of legal reform”. In light of this 
dimension of power and the example presented in the first dimension, one might 
assume that possible conflicts of interests have previously been subjugated. If for 
instance, the government would prefer a lowering of prices or stricter regulations 
concerning safety trials or provision of pharmaceutical products, it might have ignored 
this interest/preference, because of the anticipated response from Big Pharma. Thus 
Big Pharma’s ability to impose economic sanctions enables them with tacit power of 
coercion. Even though they do not explicitly exercise the power they have denied 
consideration over potential issues. We must however stress, once again, that the 
exercise of non-decision-making behaviour/non-behaviour is philosophical since it is 
not observable. In case the conflict of interest becomes observable or a potential issue 
becomes a tangible issue, the power exercised will transpire as first dimensional. 
 
Conclusion 
Considering the fact that the power in the 2nd dimension for both the government and 
pharmaceutical industry essentially are extensions of their power in the 1st dimension, 
we conclude that the government in principle has the greater power as the regulatory 
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authority and the largest single consumer. However the government the government 
makes great efforts to avoid antagonizing the pharmaceutical industry on account of 
its economic impact. 
 
4.3 Third Dimension of Power 
Lukes final dimension of power further develops the scope of the second dimension, 
as he considers Bachrach and Baratz’ interpretation of power inadequate in explaining 
socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour (Lukes, 2005). He argues that 
groups, individuals or institutions involved in power relations may be unable to 
recognise grievances or conflicts of interests. In such scenario B would be 
enthusiastically unaware of its inferior status and therefore fail to comprehend its 
subordinate position. B may have come to believe that its inferior position is natural, 
unavoidable or even beneficial and are consequently incapable of communicating its 
true interests (Lukes, 2005; Edgar, 2013). Andrew Edgar provides an example of such 
exercise of power: 
  
“One may consider here the manner in which patriarchy works by making 
the inferiority of women appear natural, even to women themselves, or in 
an ageist culture the way in which the ‘redundancy’ of the older person is 
internalised and accepted as a fact (rather than as a valuation). This is the 
systematic distortion of communication, where issues that should be 
available for debate have in effect been reified, and put beyond reasonable 
challenge.” (Edgar, 2013:297) 
  
Both examples support the idea that B has come to believe that its position is natural 
or unavoidable because they cannot see nor imagine any alternatives or because they 
value it as beneficial. This dimension of power is what Lukes consider the most 
supreme and insidious exercise of power (Lukes, 2005) 
 
4.3.1. Government 
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While the government may on occasion make use of 3rd dimensional power in order 
to pursue its interests in other arenas, in the context of its relationship with the 
pharmaceutical industry it does not engage in any such strategy. The government 
typically makes use of its regulatory authority in order to compel the pharmaceutical 
industry to act in a particular manner. As we shall see in the analysis of the 
pharmaceutical industry’s use of 3rd dimensional power, the government essentially 
has no corresponding power with which to counter the pressures created by the 
pharmaceutical industry through its communicative efforts directed at doctors, patients 
and patient advocacy groups. 
 
4.3.2. Pharmaceutical Industry 
Big Pharma PR 
Since Big Pharma is prohibited from direct to consumer advertising (DTCA), the 
principle target of pharmaceutical promotion is physicians, who are functioning as the 
gatekeeper between patients and their access to medicines (Badcott and Sahm, 
2012). As physicians are considered experts within the medical field and because of 
their extensive knowledge of medical literature, they themselves are sensitive to 
undue industry influence (Robertson, Rose and Kesselheim, 2012). However this 
feeling is not supported by evidence. Big Pharma relies on sales representatives 
called detailers, to promote sales and physicians rely on the detailers to provide 
information on drug benefits and risks as well as under which circumstances to 
prescribe what products (Rodwin, 2012). According to Robertson, Rose and 
Kesselheim, 2012, investigators discovered that even though physicians deny 
commercial channels to be a significant source of their information about drugs, their 
actual knowledge of drugs was less consistent with medical literature than that of 
sales information. Thus this evidence suggests that pharmaceutical advertising 
influences the bias of physicians and their prescription patterns beyond their 
consciousness and understanding exists in the works of both Bath (2005), Robertson, 
Rose and Kesselheim (2012) and Rodwin (2012). Accordingly Big Pharma succeeds 
in changing behaviour through strategic manipulation. Since the manipulation is not 
recognised by the physicians it serves as an example of third dimensional power. 
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Patient Advocacy Groups 
The purpose of patient advocacy groups (PAG) is to promote the interests of those 
who suffer from a particular disease or condition. The way they seek to achieve this is 
by conferring with the government over relevant policy, lobbying, funding research and 
by providing information to support members. This makes them important negotiators 
of the framework that regulates physicians, which subsequently regulates Big 
Pharma’s ability to exercise its third dimension power over the physicians (Edgar, 
2013). Therefore Big Pharma has an observable interest in empowering PAGs who 
can promote their interests. Fundamentally Big Pharma provides funds for PAGs, and 
in exchange they benefit from the integrity and credibility of the PAG. This partnership 
enables the parties, empowered by unification, to pursue the similar interests of both 
funder and receiver. But the assertion that they share identical interests is challenging 
(Edgar, 2013). Batt (2005) argues that the newest medications are in general 
assumed to be the best possible treatment and as a result patient members of PAGs 
that seeks the best possible care, will demand access to the newest products, which is 
what the funder manufacture. Yet Batt (2005) goes on stating that the assumption that 
new is better is not always true. Being that information to patients is provided by Big 
Pharma, patients end up unaware of what is in their best interest and as long as they 
trust the information provided to them they become unable to identify their potential 
conflict with Big Pharma. Additionally, if one looks at the power relations between 
PAGs and Big Pharma in Lukes first and second dimension, the PAG appears fragile 
to the threat of Big Pharma by removing its funding, and if conflicts are not entirely 
identical, Big Pharma’s capacity to exert its power vastly outweighs the PAG’s. 
Moreover, evidence suggests that Big Pharma possesses power, not only in the first 
and second dimension, but also in the third. “The dilemma for many is that any funding 
is better than no funding and industry funding allows them to mount programs to serve 
their communities that they could otherwise not afford. Having accepted industry 
money, however, organizations become blind to its co-opting effects.”  (Batt, 2005:12). 
In the same journal Bath explains that co-opting effects is not only apparent in cases 
funded by industry, as there generally tends to be a bias in favour of the funder in 
organisations as it may: “gradually and almost unconsciously accommodate itself to 
the funder over time.” (Batt, 2005:5). The exercise of third dimension power emerges 
as the PAG and the patient members unconsciously adopt the interest of Big Pharma 
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without realising the actual conflict of interests. As a result of this form of indoctrination 
PAGs put pressure on the government to change regulation in order for them to 
realise their interest, but thereby they are actually promoting the interest of Big 
Pharma. “The pharmaceutical companies figured out who the real decision-makers 
are – the public.” (Batt, 2005:1) Through demonstrations, lobbying and smart media 
PR, PAGs attempts to turn public opinion against the regulatory framework and into 
pressuring the government.  
Disease-mongering 
"Disease-mongering" is a term for the increased medicalisation that exists within 
public health and which is fuelled by the pharmaceutical industry. It has become a 
significant area of debate in global healthcare and refers to how the definitions of 
diseases are expanding, allowing healthcare markets to widen and giving the 
pharmaceutical industry even greater potential to profit from newly identified 
"illnesses" (Henry & Moynihan, 2006:425). Various tactics are employed by 
pharmaceutical companies to create this mechanism of disease-mongering. Firstly, 
mild illnesses are beginning to be treated by aggressive uses of drugs instead of 
alternative therapies. Secondly, there is an expansion of what we define as medical. 
For instance, aspects of life such as disruptive behaviour of children at school has 
been medicalised into a specific disorder (ADHD). There is also an evident increase in 
the promotion of anxiety in patients, causing them to fear their future health due to an 
increased knowledge in these newly identified "illnesses" (Mintzes, 2006:461).  
 
Disease-mongering is highly problematic for public health institutions such as the 
NHS, which is under increasing pressure to stretch its funding (Deer & Webb, 
2007:122). One of the main ways in which the pharmaceutical industry promotes 
these newly defined diseases is through disease awareness campaigns because of 
the regulatory limits they have on advertising prescription drugs. These campaigns are 
forms of advertising that are aimed at promoting a particular branded medicine at their 
launch, and encourages patients to seek professional medical help for a specific 
illness. (Health Committee Report, 2005:70). The consequences of over-
medicalisation, associated with disease-mongering, has been  identified in the 2005 
House of Commons Health Committee report on the influence of pharmaceutical 
industry. Quoting Graham Vidler from Which? on these awareness campaign tactics: 
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 "What those awareness campaigns will do is encourage the public to go and see their 
GP, often in quite strong terms, saying, "Go and see your GP. Be forceful. There is 
something that can be done." Simultaneously, the companies will be advertising 
specific drugs to those GPs, and … quite often it [is] easiest for them to take the path 
of least resistance." (Health Committee Report, 2005). 
 
One specific area of health that has been susceptible to both disease-mongering and 
pharmaceutical industry's vested interest in awareness campaigns, is mental health. 
The report emphasises this, highlighting the problems associated with the 'Defeat 
Depression Campaign' which ran in the UK between 1992 and 1997. The campaign 
was run by the Royal College of psychiatrists but partly funded by the pharmaceutical 
industry and its aim to encourage depression to be treated with more anti-
depressants. However the royal college stated that it did not wish to promote mild 
forms of depression to be treated with aggressive drugs, only more severe forms. The 
health committee however disagreed with this and argue in the report that this 
sentiment did not reflect in the advertisements. (House of Commons report, 2005:71). 
This campaign marks the beginning of intense medicalisation of mental health, 
departing from traditional talking therapies, to an increased use in treating mental 
illness with drugs. Pharmaceutical companies are profiting from these new definitions 
of depression by emphasising how our neurochemistry can be modified with drugs, 
blurring the boundary between unhappiness and depression (Rose, 2006:481). The 
report echoes this concern, which Lord Warner expresses: 
 
"The belief that every problem may be solved with medication seems particularly 
relevant in the context of antidepressants. While we readily accept that 
antidepressants can be effective medicines and have been successfully used by many 
patients, it is also clear that SSRIs, in particular, have been over-prescribed to 
individuals, often with mild forms of depression, who may be distressed by difficult life 
circumstances. Unhappiness is part of the spectrum of human experience, not a 
medical condition." (House of commons report, 2005:100). 
 
Although disease-mongering should not only be attributed to the pharmaceutical 
industry's influence as there are other contributing factors, big Pharma's corporate 
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motives is at the heart of combating disease-mongering (Rose, 2006:478). Disease-
mongering can be justified as a display of Luke's third dimension of power in a variety 
of ways. Firstly, the influence of awareness campaigns and the redefinition of 
symptoms into recognised diseases does not merely target patients but also the 
doctors who will prescribe it. These "disease-mongering" campaigns however are not 
just aimed at promoting a particular drug, but a way of manipulating the patient's 
knowledge around a collection of symptoms. The pharmaceutical companies have the 
patent to treat a collection of symptoms, which is then turned into a new illness to fit 
the effect of the drug (Rose, 2006:479). Pharma's display of economic rationality, in 
which demand is manipulated to create profits, contradicts the just aims of public 
health provision and exposes how Pharma uses subtle and methods to manipulate 
patients and clinicians  (Edgar, 2013:302). The fact that patients and more importantly 
physicians, believe that they are making rational choices and acting in their own best 
interest, without recognising the manipulative role of Big Pharma is what makes it third 
dimension power exercise. 
Conclusion 
Despite the recognition from Government that commercial interests are prevalent in  
the promotion of particular drugs, it is interesting that the Government involves the 
industry and patient groups into the discussion about new regulation. In regards to the 
third dimension of power, this clearly expresses how the industry is able to manipulate 
the government in weakening the regulation on their promotional activities. 
 
4.4 Overall Conclusion 
 
Arguably, the government and pharmaceutical industry are essentially evenly matched 
if one is to look at their respective powers in the 1st dimension. The government has 
the full regulatory authority allowing it to place any restrictions or demands on the 
pharmaceutical industry that it so wishes. It holds the power to approve or disapprove 
of a pharmaceutical company’s products for marketing and sale, and may place any 
burden of proof of the safety and efficacy of a drug on the pharmaceutical company. 
The MHRA in this sense is the ultimate gatekeeper, ensuring the safety of the public 
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and compelling the pharmaceutical industry to develop products that are safe, 
efficacious and cost effective. Equally, the fact that government is the single biggest 
purchaser of prescription medicines in the country gives it a high level of consumer 
power. Should the government determine that a particular drug does not provide the 
required level of benefit to patients, it can refuse to purchase the drug and thereby 
cause immense damage to the profitability of the concerned pharmaceutical company.  
Conversely, the sheer size of the pharmaceutical industry and its impact on the UK 
economy necessarily gives it a certain amount of power. This power, while not 
allowing the pharmaceutical industry to dominate, still creates a counterweight to the 
government’s regulatory and consumer power. It is in the perspective that one can 
expect a balance to be created between the needs of healthcare and the needs of 
industry. 
 
The second dimension in turn, as an extension of the first dimension, retains the same 
balance. Though the power of government and the pharmaceutical industry need not 
always be expressed, the mere threat of possible exercise of power is sufficient to 
sustain the balance. It can reasonably be argued that the power balance tilts 
somewhat in favour of the government with its regulatory power.  
It is not until we account for power in the 3rd dimension that the asymmetry of the 
power relations become apparent. The pharmaceutical industry’s ability to influence 
prescribers, patients and patient advocacy groups, allow it a level of influence that 
essentially nullifies the government’s power in the first and second dimension. 
 
The government in fact does not have the regulatory autonomy nor the consumer 
power implied by the first dimension. The fact that the pharmaceutical industry can 
activate patients to demand certain drugs through patient advocacy groups and 
“disease-mongering” campaigns and thereby compel the government to take certain 
actions it would not otherwise do, indicate that in the final equation the pharmaceutical 
industry dominates the power relationship. Whether this takes the shape of influencing 
the government’s decisions in terms of regulation or preventing it from making certain 
decision, end result remains that the government is unable to exercise its power in the 
1st and 2nd dimension, not only because of the pharmaceutical industry’s balancing 
economic clout, but also because of the industry’s immense power in the 3rd 
dimension. The government’s consumer power is also severely inhibited by the same 
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factors. The government cannot make a decision as a consumer without taking into 
consideration the pressure that can be exerted on it via patient advocacy groups 
demanding a specific drug.  
The end result is that the government, even when faced with empirically supported 
criticism of the pharmaceutical industry finds itself unable to take the required steps to 
curb the pharmaceutical companies.  
 
In the next section we do a review of the government’s response to the Health 
Committee’s 2005 report on the pharmaceutical industry in light of the perspective 
developed by our power analysis to see if there is evidence of the asymmetric power 
relations implied by the analysis. 
 
 Dimension 1 2 3 
Government Regulatory power 
Consumer power 
 Tacit Coercion  None 
Big Pharma Economic power: 
 
Tacit Coercion PR 
Disease Mongering 
Patient Advocacy 
Groups 
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5. Review of UK Government’s Response 
 
This section comprises a review of the UK government’s response to the 
recommendations in the Health Committee’s report. The objective of this section is to 
apply the understanding of the power relations derived from our analysis to the 
understanding of the government’s response. Gøtzsche (2013:37-38) notes how the 
Health Committee report highlights many of the concerns he himself illustrates in his 
criticism of the global pharmaceutical industry, yet it led to almost no substantive 
action from the government to address these issues. Rather, he claims,  the 
government essentially downplayed many of the issues, citing already existent 
regulation as sufficient or outrightly denying the validity of the Health Committee’s 
concerns. 
 
The analysis we conduct is not meant to be a comprehensive and exhaustive 
deconstruction of language and meaning. Rather it serves to illustrate the point 
established by the power analysis that the asymmetric power relations between 
government and Big pharma make it all but impossible for the government to initiate 
any regulatory policies that curtail the behaviour of Big Pharma in any meaningful way. 
We do not take this to mean that the government is being strong-armed by Big 
Pharma to wilfully ignore the issues. The relatively subtle nature of power in the 
second and third dimension mean that the government’s regulatory tendencies are 
curbed by keeping things off the table or creating the impression that all is well and 
good as things stand. 
Introduction (Paragraph 1 - 4) 
The introduction neatly summarizes the government’s positions in a number of key 
areas. Already in the introduction the first mention is the importance of the 
pharmaceutical sector and the text stresses the government’s focus on balance to 
“secure beneficial outcomes for patients and the economy”. There is an underlying 
assumption that balance can be achieved in its dealings, though our power analysis 
shows otherwise.  
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The response then mentions the government’s aim to have a “patient led NHS” which 
is to be achieved by providing them the information to qualify them for participation. As 
our power analysis shows, the “expert patient” is in fact a manifestation of Pharma 
power in the 3rd dimension (Edgar, 2013).  
Research & Development (Paragraph 5 - 8) 
This entire section is focused on how the NHS can attract pharmaceutical companies 
and persuade them to spend money on R&D in the UK, by employing the clinical 
resources at the government’s disposal. It notes that some “inconsistencies” with 
research ethics and governance, but claims to have already addressed the issue by 
providing  a managed operating system.  Unsurprisingly, the remedy for such 
oversight, in the eyes of the government lies not with Big Pharma , but rather with the 
regulatory framework. 
Regulation (Paragraph 9 - 13) 
The Government’s statements on regulation focus on the adequacy of already 
established or imminent regulatory frameworks. The government puts great stock in 
the amended European Legislation that imposed new requirements on pharmaceutical 
companies to provide any new “relevant” information to regulatory authorities. While 
this may at first glance appear as a tightening of regulation, it is up to the 
pharmaceutical company to determine what information is “relevant”. Leaving this 
open to interpretation allows the pharmaceutical company to conceal whatever 
information it so chooses. The MHRA will be unable to regulate, when the decision to 
share or not share particular information continues to lie with the pharmaceutical 
company. 
 
The government goes on to speak of the establishment of a communication division in 
the MHRA and how this addresses (among other things)  the issue of raising 
awareness of risk and benefit in medicines and services. Again, as our analysis 
shows, the MHRA depends on clinical trial information provided by pharmaceutical 
companies. This means that the establishment of a communication division may 
improve the quality of communication on risk awareness, however the content of the 
information is only as good as that which is provided by the pharmaceutical 
companies themselves. Additionally, MHRA cannot hope to compete with the massive 
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and highly professional PR and Marketing departments of the pharmaceutical industry 
as a whole. 
 
The government also praises the Yellow Card Scheme as a pivotal aspect of the 
MHRA’s and accepts the Health Committee’s recommendations for its improvement. It 
makes particular note of the inclusion of the patients in the regulatory process. This 
can arguably be considered a move that may place some restrictions on profits that 
pharmaceutical companies can make on a particular drug. However, the Yellow card 
Scheme has some fundamental issues that significantly reduce its effectiveness in 
discovering the true extent of Adverse Drug Reaction that it was designed to reveal 
(Chaplin, 2009). Thus the government’s faith in the YCS as a significant line of 
defence may be somewhat misplaced.  
 
The government’s support of the first two points can all be construed as examples of 
pharmaceutical dominance since in both cases it involves the decision to share 
pertinent information with the MHRA as something that remains in the hands of the 
pharmaceutical companies. Likewise the focus on the Yellow Card Scheme places the 
onus on patients and health professionals to report back voluntarily to the NHS 
regarding  adverse drug reactions and not pharmaceutical companies. Again no 
pressure is on the pharmaceuticals. We find the fact that none of the government’s 
initiatives involve compelling the pharmaceutical companies to share information as an 
indication of pharmaceutical power since no such regulation made it to the agenda. 
Moving Forward  (Paragraph 13 - 18) 
The government speaks of the need identified by the report of a forum to 
communicate future priorities to the industry. This indicates that at best the 
government can advise and request a certain research agenda, however it is 
ultimately the pharmaceutical industry that determines the research agenda. 
The remaining text in this section however outlines the plans for the future and while 
these do not ignore patient needs, they clearly focus on the industry rather than the 
medicines and treatment of patients. This perhaps more than anything, indicates how 
the objectives of the government seem to be more closely aligned with those of the 
pharmaceutical industry rather than patient care. Considering the relatively critical 
tone of the initial Health Committee report towards the pharmaceutical industry, it 
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seems strange that the government’s plans for the future have such a strong 
commercial perspective. Again this can be taken an indication of pharmaceutical 
power  since any talk of curbing pharmaceutical companies seems to have fallen by 
the wayside and replaced with industry interests. Even the point regarding the 
regulatory environment seems to focus on the need to avoid “sudden scares” rather 
than harm to patients. 
Relations with the Government (Paragraph 19) 
This section most evidently displays how the concerns of the Health Committee are 
redefined and sidelined. The government starts out with the statement that the 
“Committee considered which Department would be best placed to represent the 
interests of the pharmaceutical industry”. In truth the Report was less concerned with 
the which department could best represent the pharmaceutical industry and more with 
the inability of the Department to “prioritise the needs of patients and public health 
over the needs of the pharmaceutical industry” (The Influence of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 2005:6). The Committee recommended that the pharmaceutical industry be 
placed under the auspices of the Department of Trade and Industry for this very 
reason.  
 
The government carries on in its response claiming that the report demonstrates how 
the interests of industry and the patients are not mutually exclusive. Again this is not 
untrue, but a misrepresentation of the initial report. The report states that the interests 
of the pharmaceutical companies may often overlap with those of the public, patients 
and the NHS but they are not identical (The Influence of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
2005:3). In both these cases, the core concerns of the Health Committee are 
addressed only peripherally in the government’s response. Rather the issues are 
framed in a manner that favors the relationship with the pharmaceutical industry. Our 
analysis concurs with the Health Committee report, the split loyalties of the 
Department of Health, rather than allowing it to balance the needs of healthcare and 
industry, actually sacrifices the needs of healthcare for those of industry.  
 
The refusal to acknowledge its inability to prioritize and insistence that the interests of 
pharmaceutical companies and public health can (contrary to many sources) be well 
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aligned seems to fly in the face of what would be to the benefit of its mandate to 
promote health in the UK. 
Responses to Recommendations 
The government then moves on to its specific responses to particular 
recommendations. These are more detailed responses to many of the same issues 
already outlined earlier in the report. We will do a cursory review to point out elements 
not already mentioned. 
Recommendation 1 from the Health Committee pertains to the existence of a large 
number of “me too” drugs. The HC seeks an advisory framework to sort out the 
confusion for prescribers. The Government however responds essentially that such is 
not possible and that the existing framework is sufficient. One could however argue 
that the confusion could conceivably provide an advantage to those companies with 
more established brands i.e. those with bigger marketing budgets. So in not 
attempting to sort out the confusion the government’s inaction actually helps the 
bigger companies who typically charge more than the “me-too” generics.  
 
Recommendation 2 addresses records of clinical trials or rather the lack of an 
independent body to review the data of trials conducted by pharmaceutical companies 
for their drugs. The government cites european legislation as a reason for this to be 
unnecessary. The legislation requires that summaries of the findings of the clinical 
trials be submitted to the MHRA as a part of gaining the marketing authorisation. This 
again fails to address the main issue highlighted by Gøtzsche (2013) regarding the 
manner in which pharmaceutical companies interpret the raw data in the most 
favorable way for the approval of their drug. The requirement for only summaries to be 
submitted prevents a review of the raw data and thus does not undergo the critical 
review required to determine the validity of the trial results.  
 
Recommendation 3 again addresses the weaknesses in the manner in which clinical 
trials are conducted, both in terms of discovering the therapeutic value of new 
medicines and in terms of the scientific ethics. Again the government sidelines the 
concerns, stating that the current system is adequate to the task. What is remarkable 
is that rather than as a gatekeeper preventing ineffective and/or dangerous drugs from 
being released to the market, the MHRA is presented as a facilitator offering advisory 
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services and guidelines to pharmaceutical companies. Given that the issues of 
ineffective and unsafe drugs being released to the market by large pharmaceutical 
corporations with extensive resources at their disposal, it seems odd that rather than 
acting as a gatekeeper, the government sees the MHRA’s role in an advisory capacity.  
 
Recommendation 4 relates to the increased facilitation of clinical trials by the NHS. 
This recommendation is accepted by the government.  
 
Recommendation 5 & 6 both pertain to the marketing activities of pharmaceutical 
companies. The HC recommendation recommends firstly that the exposure of 
prescribers to pharmaceutical marketing be limited, secondly that promotional material 
be pre-vetted and, to restrict prescribing rights for a period after the launch of a drug. 
The government again responds that there is no indication that the currently used 
regulations are not effective. This perspective again precludes the possibility of any 
change even though there is sufficient evidence that the marketing activities of 
pharmaceutical companies are very influential and affect the way in which physicians 
prescribe (Robertson, Rose & Kesselheim, 2012).  
 
Recommendation 7, 8 and 9 speak of the process of dealing with complaints of 
marketing and advertising. The HC advises stricter regulation , but the government’s 
response is that such has already taken place. To the call for stricter punitive action 
the government counsels caution to ensure that responses are “proportionate”. 
 
Recommendation 10 refers to the use of the PPRS in the punitive arena, to deduct the 
allowances for research, marketing and development of companies found to have 
published misleading findings and breaching marketing regulations. The government 
agrees and commits to bring up the issue in the next round of negotiations with the 
ABPI. It also adds however the possibility of rewarding companies for their innovation. 
The government’s response shows that it will not do to deny the problems inherent in 
the marketing and communication practices of pharmaceutical companies. It however 
adopts a less confrontational stance. Here we consider that the government’s 
unwillingness to engage this issue is a tactical move and indicates that commercial 
interests take precedent on account of the economic power that the pharmaceutical 
industry has.  
56 
 
Recommendation 11 addresses the need for creating a database of the information 
sent to the MHRA by pharmaceutical companies. The government agrees with this but 
with the caveat that it must be done only after the licensing authority has reviewed the 
data. Since the government does not directly oppose the recommendation, we expect 
that the pharmaceutical industry does not take issue with the publication of this 
material.  
 
Recommendation 12 speaks of the fact that the MHRA is not always permitted to audit 
compliance reports of the pharmaceutical companies. The government does not 
support the recommendation stating that the MHRA always has the option to do so. 
The fact that there are completely opposite views of what actually takes place 
indicates that somewhere along the line some illegal action is taking place. However 
the government precludes any further action on the matter.  
 
Recommendation 13 and 14 both pertain to the matter of data and more intensive 
analysis of adverse reactions after a product is launched. In both cases the 
government accepts the concern but considers the existing framework sufficient for 
dealing with the challenge. 
 
Recommendation 15 again pertains to MHRA monitoring and the possible 
establishment of an independent monitoring agency for post marketing surveillance. 
The government accept the concerns but shuts down the idea of post marketing 
surveillance considering it an impediment. The pattern of outrightly refusing any 
additional oversight continues and is thus struck from the agenda. 
 
Recommendation 16 speaks of giving MHRA be given authority to propose restrictions 
to which the government responds that such powers already exist or will be 
implemented as a part of european legislation. 
 
Recommendation 17 refers to the Yellow Card Scheme, to which the government 
responds in agreement. We have already mentioned that questions can be raised 
regarding how effective the yellow card scheme actually is, however it is considered 
perfectly adequate by the government.  
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Recommendation 18 seeks a public inquiry whenever a drug is withdrawn on health 
grounds. To this the government does not agree, saying that each case needs to be 
evaluated separately. Given how a public inquiry can result in greater awareness of 
unethical behaviour of the pharmaceutical companies, taking the possibility off the 
agenda shows the power of the pharmaceutical industry in protecting its interests. 
 
Recommendation 19 refers to the process of “evergreening” by the pharmaceutical 
industry, an issue the government accepts and commits to discussing at a later stage.  
 
Recommendation 20 addresses the need to review the working of the MHRA and 
whether it truly works for the benefit of patients’ health needs and society in general. 
To this the government states that such reviews have already been conducted but 
agrees that regular reviews of this sort are a good idea.  
 
Recommendation 21 calls for the training of medical students to deal some of the 
challenges created by the pharmaceutical industry. To this the government responds 
that the current system is robust and that no change is required. Considering that a 
significant part of pharmaceutical marketing budgets are specifically aimed at medical 
personnel, and that they have been found to be highly effective, we deem the 
government’s judgement to be enabling the power of the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
Recommendation 22 aims at providing independent advisory services to prescribers. 
The government does not accept that prescribers lack independent advice. It does 
however keep open the possibility of updating some of the existing advisory 
frameworks. 
 
Recommendation 23 pertains to establishment of a register to monitor the interests of 
health professionals to keep track of any benefits they may gain from the 
pharmaceutical industry. The government accepts this but also says that this can only 
be done at a local level. 
 
Recommendation 24 addresses the issue of disease-mongering as mentioned in our 
power analysis. The HC calls for guidelines to make the public aware when a 
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campaign against a particular disease is sponsored by the company that provides the 
treatment for said disease. The government agrees. The HC’s recommendation may 
be somewhat counterproductive since the revelation of the company in the campaigns 
may in fact result in functioning as a direct marketing tool of the product.  
 
Recommendation 25 covers the issue of patient advocacy groups receiving support 
from pharmaceutical companies. The government accepts the concern but considers 
self-regulation to be the correct manner of dealing with the issue. 
 
Recommendation 26 deals with increased funding of NICE which the government 
takes note of but defers to a future spending review. 
 
Recommendation 27 speaks of the educational sector and the requirements for 
qualified workforce for the industry. The government responds that the issue is being 
addressed by the Education Department. 
 
Recommendation 28 is regarding the funding of a multidisciplinary funding of existing 
medicines. Again the government states that it already funds studies of this sort and 
considers them adequate to the task. 
 
Recommendation 29 refers to the illness resulting from use of medicines. The 
government repeats the refrain that much effort is already being done on the matter 
and does not indicate that anything else will be done. 
 
Recommendation 30 seeks a National Drugs Policy to counter some of the issues in 
the use and prescription of drugs in the UK. The government agrees with the 
sentiment of the recommendation but claims that such is not possible and points to 
prescribers rights to determine the content of a prescription as well as stating that the 
existing framework is sufficient. 
 
Recommendation 31 aims to adopt policy to emphasize non-drug approaches. THe 
government agrees and states that adapting existing approaches are sufficient for this 
to be achieved. 
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Recommendation 32 refers to the fact that the HC concludes that the split loyalties of 
the Health Department between the often opposing interests of public health and 
pharmaceutical companies make it difficult to prioritize the health concerns of patients 
over the commercial concerns of pharmaceuticals. The government rejects this notion 
citing the need for both areas being under a single umbrella in order to balance their 
interests. 
 
Conclusion: 
What becomes clear in this review is that in spite of the Health Committee identifying a 
number of serious challenges and problems caused by the pharmaceutical industry, 
the government either does not accept the recommendation, claims that the existing 
regulatory framework is sufficient, or counsels only minor changes to address the 
problems highlighted by the Health Committee’s report. 
This discrepancy between what both independent researchers as well as the 
Committee has concluded regarding pharmaceutical industry influence and the 
government’s response can indicate that:  
Either the government is cognizant of the pharmaceutical industry’s power and sees 
that it ultimately will not be able to impose or enforce the level of regulation suggested 
by the Health Committee, or the government is unaware of the extent to which the 
pharmaceutical industry exercises power over it. Regardless, the end result is the 
same. The pharmaceutical industry continues to influence government to an extent 
where its interests supersede the interest of public health. And the asymmetric power 
relations ensure that the government cannot take the required regulatory steps to curb 
the industry’s influence. 
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6. Discussion  
 
This project had as its aim to question the basic assumptions that lie behind the 
partnership between public health and the private enterprise of pharmaceuticals. The 
fundamental argument for the integral involvement of the pharmaceutical industry is 
that without it, society would not benefit from the many innovative medicines 
developed by the industry since its infancy. Market competition drives pharmaceutical 
companies that invest heavily in research and development in order to discover and 
produce new medicines and treatments, thus ensuring that people live longer and 
healthier lives (Badcott, 2012). 
  
On the other hand, the profit motive driving private enterprises like pharmaceutical 
companies may pressure them into engaging in practices that negate the positive 
effect of their innovation. The pharmaceutical industry in particular has been accused 
of doing so on a regular basis. As the Thalidomide disaster in the 60s can attest, when 
it comes to public health, this can have horrific consequences. Be it rushing drugs to 
the market that have not been properly tested, engaging in “bad” science, pursuing 
marketing strategies designed to fleece the healthcare system and its patients, 
creating a climate of fear to increase the demand for medicines, the profit motive of 
pharmaceutical companies can lead them to pursuing less than admirable tactics. 
 
We are informed that such disasters are the result of either a few rotten apples or 
genuine errors, however there is no need to worry because the pharmaceutical 
industry is heavily regulated now. In fact it is one of the most heavily regulated 
industries in the world. These regulations, imposed by national governments ensure 
both maximum benefit and safety to the public. Ineffective or dangerous medicines 
therefore cannot pass through the eye of the regulatory needle. This is guaranteed by 
government and its institutions and we may rest easy knowing that our interests are 
looked after by the authorities. 
Unfortunately, as our analysis shows, this assumption is not entirely correct. 
Government can only protect the interests of the public if it possesses power greater 
than that of any whose interests might conflict with the public’s. Our analysis of the UK 
government’s relationship with Big Pharma indicates that contrary to common 
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perception, in the area of public health, the pharmaceutical industry has greater power 
to shape circumstances than does the UK government.  
 
The remarkably weak response from the government to the Health Committee’s report 
indicates exactly how strong the pharmaceutical industry’s influence is. What it also 
reveals (and more importantly) is the sheer discrepancy between the actual state of 
power relations between the government and the pharmaceutical industry and the 
manner in which it is perceived and discussed. This discrepancy, whether by design or 
omission, results in a debate where the cure for the excesses of the pharmaceutical 
industry almost always takes the shape of new and/or more strictly enforced 
regulation. However if, as our analysis shows, the government simply does not 
possess the power to effectively devise, implement and enforce meaningful regulation, 
then the regulatory option is simply not sufficient to safeguard the interests public 
health.  
 
We find that the focus in this debate is on how best to control Big Pharma rather than 
the best manner in which to develop and provide the medicines required by public 
health. Keeping the latter as our primary focus we suggest two possible solutions that 
we consider worth exploring. 
Solution #1 - The Regulatory Nuke 
However the current power relationship may look, in principle the UK government has 
the authority to formulate any regulation it deems necessary. That it is unable to do so 
at present is a function of the fact that government either cannot or does not wish to 
admit the actuality of the power relationship. If it accepts that it currently stands in a 
weaker position in terms of the pharmaceutical industry then it can address the issue 
and formulate and enforce radical regulations to curb that power. 
Our analysis shows that in the 1st and 2nd dimension, the power relationship is tilted 
in favour of the government as a result of its position as regulator. The pharmaceutical 
industry does not dominate the government, but it also does not have power equal to 
it. It is Big Pharma’s efficient exercise of power in the 3rd dimension that all but 
nullifies the ability of the government to formulate regulations to efficiently curb Big 
Pharma. 
 
62 
As our analysis shows, the pharmaceutical industry makes frequent use of its vast 
marketing and communication resources to influence government. Whether it is 
through PR, disease-mongering campaigns, or by co-opting patient advocacy groups, 
it is the ability to communicate that allows them to change perceptions and set 
perspectives. If government, accepting that it is being dominated by the 
pharmaceutical industry, formulates regulation to completely silence the 
pharmaceutical industry’s ability to communicate with anybody save the government’s 
regulatory body, we believe it would be able to significantly minimize the 
pharmaceutical industry’s power.  
 
No doubt such regulation would be vehemently opposed by the industry and would 
require steely resolve on the government’s part to implement. However, while such a 
move is extremely radical and would be subject to massive opposition, it is not so 
different from the current restriction on Direct To Consumer Advertising. That the 
government prevents the pharmaceutical industry from directly influencing end 
consumers sets the precedent for regulation that completely prohibits the 
pharmaceutical industry from direct contact with prescribers, patient advocacy group 
and the population at large through other campaigns and promotions. 
 
Solution # 2 - Governmental R & D 
The pharmaceutical industry fulfils a fundamental need of healthcare by developing 
and providing medicines for the treatment of patients. This is a service that public 
health naturally cannot do without. This is the basic advantage that the industry 
provides to the general public and the fundamental argument the industry’s 
proponents make for its continued existence. What creates a problem is not the 
industry’s capacity for conducting research and producing medicines, but rather the 
profit motives that drive it. The profit motive creates a pressure for increased sales, for 
rushing new drugs through clinical trials and for extracting the maximum prices for 
every new drug that makes it to market. All of the above factors can lead 
pharmaceutical companies to engage in practices that improve the bottom line at the 
cost of the benefit to patients. Likewise it also gives the incentive to the industry to 
influence the government in manner it does. 
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We suggest that the development and production of new medicines should happen 
under the ambit of government to reduce and eventually completely remove the 
negative effects of the profit incentive. This option hearkens back to the communist 
era and the wave of nationalization that characterized the command economy of the 
Soviet Union. We, however do not consider the failure of the Soviet Union as a 
negation of publicly funded medical R&D. That for-profit organizations have superior 
R&D capabilities is an unfounded assumption that has been proven wrong by the 
successes of non-profit research programs for diseases like malaria.  
 
State run R&D would employ the same researchers and scientists at the same cost as 
pharmaceutical companies, but without the massive cost of maintaining a large 
marketing and sales force nor the healthy 20% profit margin the industry has. Without 
the pressure of sales targets, the science would be more thorough, the drugs safer 
and the research agenda more in line with the needs of the public, rather than the 
shareholders of the pharmaceutical companies. State-run R&D would also not require 
the protection of patent laws and secrecy, allowing researchers to build on each 
other’s work rather than having to duplicate much of their efforts. These advantages 
would be exponentially increased if such a system was internationalized. 
 
Again any such move is likely to be vociferously opposed and  perhaps ridiculed, 
given the spirit of the times which places such great faith in the infallibility of market 
forces. However we feel that at the very least, the idea of excluding the profit motive 
from the arena of public health ought to be seriously considered. 
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